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EMPLOYER TRAINING and SKILL SHORTAGES:
A REVIEW OF THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE
with
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FU'IURE ~EARCH by the DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
If the Germans had any secret weapon in the post-l973 economic difficulties,it is the technical
competence of their work force, which is in turn the product of their apprenticeship
system. -Umprecht and Hayes, 1982,p.139.
I think that the Japanese education system is not very good employer training is much more
effective. --Yutaka Kosai, President, Japan Center for Economic Research, 1989
The heart of this new [flexible] manufacturing landscape is the management of manufacturing
projects: selecting them, creating teams to work on them, and managing workers' intellectual
development. --Ramchandran Jaikumar, 1986, p. 75.
A growing number of commentators are pointing to employer sponsored training (OJT) as a critical
determinant of competitiveness and standards of living. American employers and workers, it is charged, are
failing to invest sufficient time and resources in training on the job (Commission of the Skills of the American
Workforce 1990). The Office of Technology Assessment (1990), for example, concluded:
When measured by international standards, most American workers are not well trained. Many
in smaller fIrms receive no formal training. Larger fIrms provide more formal training, but
most of it is for professionals, technicians, managers, and executives. Our major foreign
competitors place much greater emphasis on developing workforce skills at all levels Our
major trading competitors provide more and better worker training (p. 3,4).
Training is an extremely important issue, but very hard to study. Government statistical agencies have
only recently begun asking questions about it and there is, at present, no standardization of data collection
procedures across countries. Most training is informal in character and therefore hard to measure. Its effects
on productivity are also difficult to quantify. Consequently, there have been almost no studies of the central issue
of the impact of employer training on worker productivity. Research has, consequently, focused on issues such
as who gets formal training and the impact of formal training (or tenure interpreted as a proxy for informal
training) on tangential outcomes such as wage rates and turnover. The fIndings of this research are reviewed
in sections 1.1 and 13.
An elegant theory has been developed that attempts to explain how the quantity of training is determined
and who pays for and benefIts from it. However, the absence of data on the key theoretical constructs of the
theory--general training, specifIc training, informal training and productivity growth--means that the only
predictions of the theory that have been tested relate to the effects of formal training and tenure on wage growth
and turnover. DefInitive tests of the OJT theory have not been forthcoming because the large number of
unobservables means that any given phenomena has many alternativ~ explanations (Garen, 1987).
Consequently, a good deal is known about the incidence of formal training and about the effect of tenure
and formal training on wages and turnover, but little is known about its impact on productivity. Employers
arrange for and pay for training because it raises productivity; not because it raises wages. Policy maker's
interest in training derives from its effect on productivity; not its effect on wages. The two effects are generally
DOt the same. Highest priority should be given to research on the productivity effects of training. Studies of
wage effects alone have lesser priority.
This report proposes that the Department of Labor undertake a program of research designed to inform
the policy debate related to skill shortages and the role of employer training in ameliorating them. The paper
reviews the currently available evidence and then proposes new research on seven questions.
1. HOW DO TRAINING AND SKILL DIFFERENTIALS ACROSS COUNTRIES AND ACROSS
FIRMS WITHIN A COUNTRY EFFECT mE PRODUCTION PROCESS AND FIRM
PRODUCTIVI1Y? HOW DO SKILL DIFFERENTIALS INFLUENCE mE
IMPLEMENTATION OF FLEXIBLE DECENTRALIZATION, TOTAL QUALI1Y
MANAGEMENT AND omER EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A HIGH PERFORMANCE WORK
ORGANIZATION?
HOW IS mE AMOUNT AND CHARACTER OF mE EMPLOYER TRAINING CHANGING
OVER TIME?
2.
3. DO AMERICANS RECEIVE LESS TRAINING FROM EMPLOYERS THAN TIlEIR
COUNTERPARTS OVERSEAS?
ARE mEY LESS SKILLED?
Assuming an affIrmative answer to the third and fourth questions:
4.
WHY ARE AMERICAN WORKERS LESS WELL TRAINED AND LESS SKILLED?
IS THERE MARKET FAILURE IN mE PROVISION OF EMPLOYER TRAINING?
IS SCHOOL PROVIDED OCCUPATIONAL TRAINING A SUBSTITUTE OR A
COMPLEMENT FOR TRAINING ON mE JOB?
Most of these questions cannot be answered in currently available data sets. I, therefore, propose that
the Department of Labor concentrate on funding studies which collect and analyze new data. The most
important issue for research is # 1, the effect of training on production processes and productivity. Studies that
look at training without evaluating its outcomes should receive lower priority.
For most kinds of training, outcomes are as much organizational as individual. Consequently, a good
deal of effort needs to be devoted to studies conducted at the organizational level which examine how training
fits into the organization's overall competitive strategy and effects its profitability. Examples of the kinds of
studies that need to be replicated are the work of John Krafcik (1990) and John Paul MacDuffie on auto
assembly plants around the world, the study of computerized machine tools by Hartman and colleagues (1983),
Ramchandran Jaikumar's (1986) study of flexible manufacturing in Japan and the United States, Maurice and
Sellier and Silvestre's (1986) comparison of French, German and British plants and the intensive case studies
of specific industries conducted by S. J. Prais, Hillary Steedman, Karin Wagner and collaborators at the National
Institute of Economic and Social Research in London.
5.
6.
7.
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The paper is organized as follows. The first section of the paper presents a quick review of what is
known about Ouestions :(lIto 4. Some unique data on the magnitude and effects of the new ~e training and
how it varies by occupation are presented in section 1.1. Estimates of training's impact on productivity growth
of new hires are presented in section 1.2. Other research on the incidence and effects of formal training is
reviewed in section 13. In section 1.4 the limitations of currently available data on training and its effects are
discussed and new data collection is recommended. In section 15 I propose a new approach to asking questions
about on-the-job learning and training.
Section 2 of the paper presents a preliminary examination of Question II 5--why American employers
and workers appear to invest less in training than the Germans and Japanese. Section 3 presents a preliminary
examination of Ouestion II 6. It examines what is known about the extent of market failure in the provision of
employer training. Studies of apprenticeship programs in Germany, Great Britain and the United States suggest
that employers are financing part of the cost of apprenticeship training. Econometric analysis of wage levels and
rates of wage and productivity growth due to tenure also suggest that employers are contributing to the costs of
non-apprenticeship training that develops skills which are useful at many firms. H this is indeed the case, the
training market is probably generating less training than wouJd be socially optimal. More research is required
on this topic. Section 4 examines the advantages and disadvantages of locating occupational training in
enterprises rather than schools. Priorities for future research are discussed at many different places in the text,
generally immediately following a discussion of the past research which informs and guides my proposals. These
sections are highlighted by appearing in large print bold italics. The final section of the paper recapituJates
3
the recommendations for new research.
I. WHAT IS KNOWN ABOUT THE INCIDENCE AND IMPACTS OF TRAINING?
1.1 Estimates of the Magnitude or On-the-Job Training or New Hires
Let us begin by examining the magnitude of trairiing investments in newly hired workers. The data
which form the basis of discussion come from a survey of 3,412 employers sponsored by the National Institute
on Education and the National Center for Research in Vocational Education (NCR VE) conducted between
February and June 1982. Most of the respondents were the owner/manager of small firms who were quite
familiar with the performance of each of the fIrm's employees. Seventy percent of the establishments had fewer
than 50 employees, and only 12 percent had more than 200 employees.
4How Training Varies with Occupation
The impact of occupation on the amount of on-the-job training typically received by a new employee
is examined in table 1. The first four rows of the table describe the average number of hours devoted to four
distinct training activities during the first 3 months after being hired. Even jobs that are thought to require little
skill-service jobs--seem to involve a considerable amount of training during the first 3 months: an average of
33 hours of watching others. 5.7 hours of formal training, 35 hours of informal training by management and 17
hours of training by coworkers. Other occupations devote considerably more time to training. The distribution
of training activities is similar across occupations, however. The typical trainee spends most of his training time
watching others do the job or being shown the job by a supervisor. Roughly equal amounts of time are spent
in each. Informal training by coworkers is next most important. Formal traininl!: provided bv specialized traininl!
personnel accounts for an averal!e of only 5 to 10 rercent of the time new hires are engal!ed in a training
activities.
These estimates of the incidence and extent of skill upgrading training are much higher than those
generated by surveys of corporate training directors and workers. Training directors are able to describe the
formal training programs offered by their company but are typically not aware of the full extent of the informal
training that occurs on the shop floor. Surveys of workers about their training experiences have been
handicapped by the way questions were posed. The January 1983 CPS, for example, asked "Since you obtained
your present job, did you take training to improve your skills." The problem with this question is that one does
not take informal training. Most informal training occurs in the context of normal supervision or in response
to a worker's request for an explanation or assistance from a coworker or supervisor. As one might anticipate,
this question results in a significant under estimate of the extent of informal training; only a third of the
respondents reported they had received any skillupgrading training and onlyabout 40 percent of the skill training
"taken"wasreported to be informal. This suggests that the CPS survey and similar questions in the
NLS and Kwh School and Beyond fail to pidc up much of the infonnaI on that workers
receive. ConsequenJ/y, studies using these data are looking at only one species of tree not the
whole forest. If we are to really understand how learning on the job occurs both for individuals
and for organizations, it will be necessary to change the way we ask questions about training in
the CPS and other surveys.
It aLro implies that international comparisons of training cannot focus on the training
that is managed by corporate training depmtmen.ts. Training departmenJs are typically larger
in big American corporations than in Japanese corporations. In Japan corporate budgets for
fonnaI training are quite small-- 0.5 percenJ of the wage bilI in firms with more than 5000
employees and 0.1 percent in firms with 30-99 employees (Dore and Sa/o 1989). The massive
TABLB I
THAI RING ARD PRODUCTIVITY GRON'l'HOP TYPICAL lOW BMPLOYDS
BY
OCCUPATIOR
Sales
Prores- Mana- Not Retail Blue
sional geral Retail Sales Clerical Collar Service
Hours Spent in Training in First 3 Months
Watching others do the job 60.0 65.0 82.8 39.2 50.4 48.1 32.7
Formal training programs 9.1 12.1 23.9 8.2 135 9.1 5.7
Informal training by management 76.6 80.4 71.8 48.5 54.6 49.3 35.1
Informal training by co-workers 31.8 23.0 33.9 23.9 26.2 26.8' 16.7
Investment in Training Time 293 295 350 185 235 200 130
Weeks to become fully trained if
no previous experience 11.1 13.4 9.2 6.5 6.7 9.0 3.4
Increase in Reported Productivity (%)
Betw. first 2 wks. & next 10 wks. 28% 32% 50% 30% 40% 32% 28%
Betw. first 3 mo. & end of year 2 38% 33% 56% 25% 32% 23% 17% ,
.,
Increase in Real Wage in First 2 Yrs. (%) 5.0% 7.7% 22.6% 9.7% 11.5% 11.5% 3.7%
Number of cases 95 112 76 203 429 649 334
NOTE: Sample is limited to jobs for which all the necessary questions on wage rates, training time, and productivity were
answered.
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investments that Japanese firms make in anu training and employee rotation do nOt appear in
these budgets.
The fifth row of the table merges the information on time devoted to particular types of training into
. single overall estimate of investment in training during the first 3 months on the job. The index values the time
that managers, coworkers and the trainee devote to training and express it in terms of hours of trainee time.
Training investment for service jobs is estimated to be 130 hours implying that the time invested in training a
typical newly hired service worker in the first 3 months is equal in value to about 25 percent (130/520) of that
worker's potential productivity during that period. Investments in training are considerably greater in other
occupations. Retail (and service sector) sales and blue collar jobs have a mean index of 185 to 200 hours
respectively or 35 to 38 percent of the new employee's potential productivity. Clerical jobs typically required the
equivalent of about 235 hours of training or about 45 percent of the new worker's potential output. Professional,
managerial and sales representatives outside the retail and service sectors required the equivalent of about 300
hours of on-the-job training or nearly 60 percent of the new worker's potential output.
The sixth row of the table reports the geometric mean of the answers to the question "How many weeks
does it take for a new employee hired for this position to become fully trained and qualified if he or she has no
previous experience in this job, but has the necessary school-provided training." Service jobs are reported to
require an average of only 3 to 4 weeks of training, retail sales and clerical jobs slightly under 7 weeks, and
professional and managerial over 10 weeks.'
The reported productivity of new employees increases quite rapidly (by roughly a third) during the first
month or so at the firm (see row 7). Despite the much greater time interval, the percentage increases between
the flTst quarter and the end of the second year (see row 8) are smaller than those during the earlier period for
blue collar, service, clerical and sales jobs. For these occupations training investments and learning by doing
seem to be large in the first few months on the job but to diminish rapidly thereafter. In the higher level,
managerial and professional jobs, reported increases in productivity are larger between the third and 24th month
than in the first few months. This reflects the more prolonged training period for these occupations. The
occupations which devote the least time to training--the service occupations--are the occupations with the smallest
increase in productivity with tenure. The reported productivity of service workers improves an average of 28
percent in the flTst month or so and a further 17 percent in the next 21 months. Occupations for which a lot
of time is devoted to training in the fmt. 3 months--professionals, clerical workers, managers and sale
representatives outside of retail and service industries--also seem to have larger than average increases in
reported productivity as the worker gains in tenure. Clerical workers, for instance, are reported to be improving
their productivity by 40 percent in the flTst month or so and by a further 32 percent by the end of the second
year on the job.
6These very rapid rates of productivity growth suggest that the total rates of return (CQmbining both
worker and employer benefits and costs) may be extremely high during the first months of employment. For
clerical workers the total costs of training during the first 3 months are 235 hours or .113 of a year's output by
. worker whose skill level is equal to that of a new employee. Since this figure is an upper bound on the
investment that contnouted to the 40 percent gain during the first months on the job, the average rate of return
must be above 354% per year (.40/.113). Since the intensity of training investment falls with tenure at the firm,
the cost of training investment during the next 21 months cannot have exceeded .7875 (1.75.235/520) of a year's
productivity by a newly hired worker. This implies that the average rate of return to training investments during
this 21 month period exceeds 40% per year (32/.7875). However, marginal rates of return to training investment
are lower and some of the gain in productivity results from learning by doing and not from training. Multivariate
aoss section models of productivity growth which yield evidence on the marginal productivity of training are
presented below.
1.2 The Payoff to New Hire Training
The analysis of EOPP data presented in Bishop (1990) and Appendix A generated tentative estimates
of both the opportunity costs and the productivity effects of training (general and specific, worker and firm
financed combined). It would appear, therefore, feasible to calculate marginal gross rates of return (for general
and specific training combined) necessary to cover the cost of capital, losses due to turnover and obsolescence.
The data were not collected for this purpose, however, so there were gaps that could only be filled by some
judicious assumptions.2 Consequently, the estimates of marginal gross rates of return for each form of training
that are reported in Table 2 must be viewed as very tentative results which will hopefully be displaced when
better data sets become available. Marginal GRORs are the ratio of the increment to yearly productivity
generated by a small increase in training divided by the cost of increased training (A detailed description is in
the notes of the table).
The estimated marginal gross rates of return diminish as the intensity of training increases. The mean
training intensity for the rust 3 months expressed in units of the time of trained wQrkers is 148 hours. As
intensity during the rust 3 months rises from 100 hours to 300 hours (double the mean), the marginal gross rate
of return (GROR) for informal OJT by co-workers drops from 43-45 percent to 25-32 percent in the two linear
models for typical new hires presented in Appendix Table 1. The linear model's GROR drops from 38-43
percent to 25 percent for watching others and from 17-23 percent to -1 to 10 percent for training by supervisors.
The marginal GROR of formal OJT is estimated to drop from 11-15 percent at 100 hours to -3 percent at 300
hours. Estimated gross rates of return calculated from models based on logarithmic specifications are
considerably higher than those based on linear specifications of productivity growth. Gross rates of return are
also typically higher for the models using the logarithm of training intensity and the square of this logarithm
TableA I
Typical Individual
Linear 11% -3% 23% 10% 45% 32% 38% 25%
Logarithmic 38% 15% 46% 24% 85% 63% 113% 90%
Particular Individual
Linear 15% -3% 17% -1% 43% 25% 43% 25%
Table , of (8. ;"f .,,)
Typical Individual
Logarithmic 118% 54% 99% 48% 112% 53% 128% 58%
Linear 43% 16% 41% 16% 48% 18% 50% 18%
Particular Individual
Logarithmic 156% 68% 109% 52% 130% 59% 146% 64%
Linear 46% 16% 38% 13% 47% 16% 46% 16%
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Table 2
Sensitivity of Marginal Gross Rates of Return Estimates to Specification
Training TraIning
Formal
Traininl!
100 hrs 300 hrs
by by Watching
SUDernsors
100 hrs 300 hrs
Co-Workers
100 hrs 300 hrs
Others
100 hrs 300 hrs
Estimates of the marginal gross rates of return to increases in the intensity of training at two different levels of training intensity:
a 100 hour investment during the first quarter of the job and a 300 hour investment during the fIrst quarter on the job. Hourly
cost factors are assumed to be 1.8 for formal training, 1.5 for training by supervisors, 1.0 for training by coworkers, and 0.8 for
watching others. When productivity growth over 2 years for the typical individual is being modeled, duration adjusted cost factor
is calculated by multiplying by the hourly cost factor by 3 for the reasons given in the text. When productivity growth of a
particular individual during the fIrst 14 months is modeled, the duration adjusted cost factor is calculated by multiplying the hourly
cost factor by 2.2. The results presented in the fIrst panel are calculated by taking the derivative of the estimated regression
equations reported in tables Mwith respect to hours of the specifIed kind of training, then multiplying by 2000, the assumed
number of hours worked in a year, and then dividing by the duration adjusted cost factor. As an example of the calculation, the
formula for formal OJT using the coefficients from the linear model in table Mor training intensity (T) equal to 300 hours was
as follows:
[(.00046 - .00000049.T.2.1.8).2000 ] / [3.1.8] = -.0256 and the coworker training formula is:
[(.00017 - .OOOOOO49.T.2).2000]/[3] = .3173. {Note that the coefficients must be divided by 100 and 10000 in order to scale them
in hours of training}. The GROR estimates presented in the second panel assume that the ftnn has 18.5 employees (this zeros
out the 5th and 7th terms of equation 3) and that aU of the training received is of the type indicated. For informal training by
supervisors, the formula is:
~
+ h./lnT.2).2000f(T*duration factor) which is [(.003 + .0064*4.605*2)*2000] f (100*3) =.4176 at T= 100 for the linear
productivity growth model for typical workers. For training by watching others, the formula is (~ + ~ +
~
.lnT.2).2000/(T*duration factor) which is [(.003 + .013*s,.. +.0064*4.605*2)*2000] f (100*3) =.504.
Obsolescence of skills and turnover mean that these cash flows do not have an infinite duration and should therefore be compared
to the sum of the interest rate, the obsolescence rate and the turnover rate times the proportion of skills that are effectively
specifIc to the ftnn.
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presented in Appendix Table 2. At the training intensities that typically prevail during the first quarter, marginal
gross rates of return are often above 40 percent.
It must be remembered, however, that these marginal GRORs include cash flows necessary to
compensate for turnover and obsolescence and are, therefore, not directly comparable to the real rates of return
to schooling and financial assets that typically lie in the range from 5 to 10 percent. If all training investments
are specific to the firm and must, therefore, be written off if workers leave and rates of turnover are high, first
year GRORs of 30 percent or more will be required to induce the firm to invest in specific training. Lillard and
Tan (1986) have estimated that the wage effects of formal training depreciate (either due to obsolescence or
ch:.ngjngjobs) at 15 to 20 percent per year. This also would imply that equilibrium in the training market would
likely yield marginal GRORs of 30 percent or more. Tan et. al. (1991), however, estimates a much lower
depreciation rate for wage rate effects of company training--6 to 7 percent per year. With all the uncertainties
regarding the best specification of the productivity growth mode~ measurement error in the training variables,
the specificity of the training, turnover rates, and the obsolescence rates, it is my view that robust estimates of
net rates of return to general on-the-job training comparable to rates of return on financial assets and physical
capital are not now feasible and will not be feasible until better data sets become available.
1.3 Summary of Empirical Findings
The major [mdings derived from Bishop's analysis of employer data on new hire training presented in
the fIrst part of the paper may be summarized as follows:
. Formal training provided by specialized training personnel accounts for only a small portion of
the training received by new hires.
. When informal training is included in the tot~ training investments in new hires are substantial
even for jobs that are generally considered unskilled.
. Productivity rises substantially during the first year on the job.
. Large establishments invest more in the training of their new hires than small and medium
sized establishments apparently because (1) they have lower turnover, (2) they have better
access to capital markets, (3) the marginal product of an hour of training time is higher at large
establishments and (4) training lowers turnover more substantially at large establishments.
. Informal training by coworkers and training by watching others do the job appear to have a
higher benefit cost ratio than informal training by management.
. Estimates of rates of return to training derived from this data should be treated with a great
deal of caution. Nevertheless, marginal rates of return to training appear to be quite high.
. The estimated benefIt cost ratio for formal training depends on how the modeJ is specified.
The productivity growth effects of formal training are bigger at large establishments. Formal
8training has significantly larger effects on wage growth than informal training. F~rmal
training's tendency to have larger effects on wagegrowth and quit rates than Informal trabUng
probably results from the fact that formal training Is better signaled to the labor 1lUU'bt.
. The reported generality of training has no significant effects on its marginal produ<:tivity.
. When training is reported to be highly general, training has a larger effect on wage growth than
when training is reported to be specific. Nevertheless, training that Is reported to be entirely
general has much larger effects on productivity growth than wage growth Implying that the
labor market treats this training as If It were at least partly specific to the finn.
Studies using individual data typically tackle different issues. Lisa Lynch's recent review of the literature
on the incidence and impact of formal employer sponsored training concluded that:
. Formal on-the-job training significantly raises wages for workers
. Formal off-the-job training improves earnings but not as much as on-the-job training
. While there is not a significant difference in the probability of males and females receiving any
type of training, males are more likely to receive OJT and females off-the-job training
. Nonwhites are less likely to receive on-the-job training than whites, holding all other
characteristics constant
. The likelihood of receiving company provided training drops when the 18Callabor market has
high unemployment
. Company provided training for young workers is not very general, i.e. not portable from
employer to employer
. While there is a link between schooling and company training it is not so much in the number
of years of school but rather in whether or not the individual has finished high school or college
. Rapid technological change in the industry of employment increases the probability of receiving
managerial training and in-house company programs
. Being in a union significantly raises the probability of receiving on-the-job training or being an
apprentice
. Managers, professional and technical employees are most likely to receive company training.
(Lynch, 1991, p. U4)
One of the most serious problems with research on training is the lack of careful analysis of the quality
of the available data on training. This gap has recently been remedied in part by Zemsky and Shapiro's (1991)
comparison of training incidence in different surveys. Comparing CPS and SIPP answers to almost identical
questions about formal training necessary to get and keep one's job, they found large diScrepancies between the
number of people reporting that they received such training in the two surveys. It would appear that answers
to questions about formal training are quite sensitive to context--nuances in the wording of questions, the format
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and length of the interview,where the questionis placed in the interviewand which the questionsappear
immediatelybefore the training question. This finding implies thai the effort to obtain reliable
~ of training by asking only about the most salient form of training--fonnal training-has
failed. Clearly the word "training- means different thin&t to different people and the
interpretation of the word depends upon context. ThaI is why future data colJection regarding
this issue should ask about "1eaming how to do one's job better- and not about training.
1.4 What Do We Need to Know about How Employer Training Differs Across Nations?
American employers appear to devote less time and resources to the training of entry level blue collar,
clerical and service employees than employers in Germany and Japan (Limprecht and Hayes 1982, Mincer and
Higuchi 1988, Koike 1984, Noll et all984, Wiederhold-Fritz 1985). In the automobile industry, for example,
newly hired assembly workers receive 310 hours of training in Japan and 280 hours of training in Japanese
managed plants located in the US, but only 48 hours of training at US owned plants in the US (Krafcik 1990).
Averaged over all auto assembly workers, annual training time is nearly three times greater in plants located in
Japan and about 80 percent greater at Japanese plants located in the US. These differentials in training are one
of the reasons why Japanese plants are more productive than American plants and Japanese built cars have such
a reputation for quality. German employers train their youthful apprentices much more thoroughly than
American employers train their teenage workers. One visible manifestation of this is the sales personnel one
deals with in Germany. They are generally much more knowledgeable about the products they are selling than
American sales clerks.
Most of what we know about comparative levels of skill and training investment comes from just a few
case studies and a host of anecdotes. Clearly there is a need for systematic data collection. This need has also
been perceived by the National Educational Goals Panel. The Technical Panel responsible for preparing
methods of monitoring progress toward the goal of a literate workforce proposed the following:
The Technical Panel recommends that any cross-national comparison include the cross-
occupational skills required in the workplace: the foundation skills and SCANS skills. Worker
performances involve four types of skills and knowledge:
0 the foundation skills, knowledge, and orientations (these include the basic
skills of reading, writing, mathematics, listening, and speaking; the higher
order cognitive skills, such as metacognitive skills and learning strategies; and
attitudes or orientations, such as taking responsibility);
0 the SCANS generic functional skills, which appear in many different
occupations and industries;
0 occupationally-specific knowledge and skills; and
0 company-specific knowledge and skills.
10
The panel felt that K-12 should have responsibility for developing the foundation and SCANS
skills. These skills therefore properly faIl within the purview of the National Goals PaneL- The
educative responsibility for occupationaIly-specific skills is shared between K-12, post-secondary
schools, and employers, but the very specificity of these skills make them unlikely candidates
for a cross-national assessment. Company-specific skills are proprietary, entirely the training
responsibility of employers, and therefore outside the scope of the National Goals Panel.
.A cross-national assessment of the foundation and SCANS skills requires a measurement battery
that extends substantially beyond even a "strengthened" NALS....
To develop an adequate cross-national assessment of cross-occupational workplace skills, the
Technical Panel recommends a staged development process....
The Technical Panel recommends that even the R&D for the cross-national assessment be done
cross-nationally, preferably through a cross-national R&D team drawn from research institutes in
the different countries....
The Technical Panel recommends that the levels of each of the skills measured in the cross-
national assessment be benchmarked against the levels required for expert performance in broadly
different occupational categories....
The Technical Panel recommends obtaining a descriptive distribution by country of those
workplace characteristics that affect skill and skill level requirements....
The details of sampling and data collection strategies should be left to the R&.D teams....
This data collection program is desirable but the cost and complexity of the project insures that it will
be many years before data of this type becomes available. A more serious objection to this proposal is its lack
of attention to occupational and fIrm specific skills. In my judgement, occupational and fIrm specific skills are
many times more important than generic skills in accounting for productivity differences between individuals and
enterprises.3 Basic and generic skills are useful not so much because they directly contribute to productivity but
because they help workers learn the occupational and flTDlspecific skills that determine productivity. A further
difficulty of this approach is the constraints on data collection that result from attempting to study representative
samples of workers. This makes meaningfu1 measurement of occupation specific skills and the productivity
outcomes of training just about impossible.
If employer training rather than schooling outcomes is to be the focus, a very different
data collection strategy is implied. Case studies are needed which focus on a specific sub-
industry or a specific production process. Only by narrowing the focus in this way is it possible
to get good measures of the context, character, cost, and consequences of training. Hard data
is essential, so data collection strategies must be adapted to the technology and skiD development
institutions of the subindustry. International comparisons are also more useful and valid when
sub-industry is held constant. Causal effects of a nation ~ training institutions on skills and
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productivity can only be identified if sub-industry is held constant. The. models for the studies
that need to be done are the worlc of John Krafdk, John Paul MacDufJie and their colleagues
on aulo assembly planls around the world (Krafdk 1990, Kraft:ilcand Macduffie 1989, Shimada
and MacDuffie 1986, Macduffie and Kochan 1988), the study of computerized machine tools
by Hartman and colleagues (1983), Ramchandran Jaikumar's (1986) study of jlexible
manufacturing in Japan and the United States and Marurice, Sellier and Silvestre (1986)
comparison of French, German and British pfonts. Another excellent group of models for the
research program are the intensive case studies of Jive industries--cIothing, kitchen cabinet
maJdng, biscuit manufacturing, tool making and hotels--conducted by researchers associated with
the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) in London. These Jive case
studies found that the British companies were less productive than their German and Dutch
counterparts and concluded that the quantity and quality of occupational training received by
young workers entering the industry MWone of the primary CfB~J of the differen1iaJs. These
studies have had an enormous effect on the policy debate in the United Kingdom.
I propose three low cost ways of stimulating this kind of research. The most economicoJ
way for the Department of Lobor to stimulate this kind of research is to fwuJ PhD dissertations.
A typical funding package might involve travel costs, 18 months of funding for the PhD student
and one month of funding for a faculty member overseeing the project. FaculJy time is a
necessary part of the package because faculty can help gain access to companies and because
their close guidance is needed. Since faculty guidance is so essential, the faculty sponsor's track
record in this style of research becomes one of the aiteria in making awards. Another aiteria
for awards should be letters of support from industry exewtives making commitments to give the
researcher access. The RFP should provide a partial list of industries in which there is speciDl
interest but should also announce that other industries would be fine if the researcher has the
necessary access and expertise. At the very top of the priority list should be flexible
manufacturing (FMS). There would be very substantial benefits from returning to the FMS
installations that JaiJaunar visited in the early 198Os, collecting comparable data on the
performance of these systems and analyzing the reasons for change. J have asked Jaikwnar how
difJicuJtsuch a project would he, and he feels that, with his help, a graduate student could do
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the job in a year and a swnmeT. Because technology and management are helfl constant,
multinational companies are a particularly interesting environment within which to do
comparative studies. The RFP should therefore suggest that proposals for comparisons of plants
located in different countries that are part of the same corporaJion would be partiJ:uImty likely
to receive favorable consideration.
The second economical approach to stimulating this kind of research is to offer to fund
the American end of studieswhichhaveEuropeanorJapanesecollaborators.At minimum an
RFP should be issued proposing an American replication of the Jive NIESR studies--hoteJs, and
manufacturers of clothing, kitchen cabinets, machinery and biscui.ts--that have had such an
enormous effect on the policy debate in the United Kingdom.
TOOL MAKING-Daly, A., Kitchens, D.M.W.N., and Wagner, K., "Produdivity, Machinery and Skills in
II SlImpk of British and GmnlIn MlITIUfocturin.gPllInJs", NtItioMlInstiIute Economic Review. Febnuuy
198.\ W. 48-60.
KITCHEN CABINETS-Steednum, KIlmy and Wagner, KIllin, ~ Second Look tit Produdivily, Machinery
and Skills in BrittIin and GmnlIny", NtItWnlIlInstituk Economic Review, November 1987. ~. 84-94.
HOTELS-Prais, SJ., K/znIis, VlIIerie, and Wagner, Kmin, "Produdivity and VOClItionlIlSkills Services in
BritJlin and GmnlIny: Hote/s", Natiotud Instituk Economic Review. November 1~ W. 52-74.
CL011lING-Steednum, KIlmy and Wagner, KIllin, 8Produdivily, Machinery and Skills: Oothing
MlITIUfllCturein Briuzin and Gemumy", Natiotud Institute Economic Review. Mil)' 1989, W. 40-57.
BISCUlTS---
For skilled occupations which require formal training in schools, a third economit:al way
of making international comparisons of worker sIdJJsis to study the competency standards that
are represented by the certijiaztion exams (HolJenstein 1983; Dare and Sako 1989). Researchers
at NIESR have done a number of such studies comparing France, Germany and the United
Kingdom and it would not be too difficult to add the United States to the sample (Prais
1981,1986, Prais and WD&'IeT1983, Prais and Steedman 1987, Steedman 1987,1989, Jarvis and
Ptvis 1989). The approach I would recommend would be to compare NocrI Student
Occupational Competency Achievement Tests (SOCATs, both written and practical tests) and
the Teacher Occupational Competency Emms (TOCATs) to the British City and Guilds exams
and comparable French exams. Because the SOCATs have separate scores for up to 15
different aspects of the job, it should be possible to identify sections of the exam that are similar
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to ce11ain sections of the European exams to which they are being compared. Data aists at
NOC11 on the SOCAT subtest scores obtained by Job Corps completen, high school v0cati01lll1
program graduates and completen of postsecondary v0cati01lll1 tedlniaz1 programs and on
TOCAT test scores of experienced workers in the occupation who sought certifkation as
vocational teachen.~ This means that rough comparisons between us performance levels and
British, German and French standards should be possible without having to arrange for NOCJ'I
tests to be administered to random samples of us workers. In addition, some industries sponsor
their own emmination/certifkation systems (for more information con/act Joan Wdls at the
Center for Workforce Development, 202-822-8405). Comparisons should also be made between
these industry exams and their European counJerparts.
An alternative approad& would be to take the British City and Guild exams and derive
from it an assessment that cou1d be administered in the US and then administer it to smaIl
samples of us workers (City and Guilds of London Institute 1987). Either way, these studies
could be expected to gain a great deal of attention to the issue of the quality occupational
training in the u.s. This problem has not received the attention it deserves primarily because
of the lack of good daJa on how our vocational students (both in high school and voc/tech
colleges) compare to similar students abroad. It would be desirable to involve trade associations
and unions in these studies by asking their memben to participate as expertson the panels that
make the comparisons. Once the studies are completed an effort should be made to involve
them in the dissemination of the jindings and in developing programs for responding to the
findings.
My final recommendation is for the Department of Labor to assign an economist to the
task of working with DECD and the World Bank (contad Hong Tan) on development of an
instrument for surveying firms and enterprises about training. This survey should not focus solely
Oft fonnaI training. Informal training and leaming-by-doing must receive equal attention. If
0IIe tried to collect information on the leaming experiences and training activities of all workers
in a medium sized establishment, the respondent burden would be incredible. The solution to
this problem is to ask about the OJT and leaming by doing experiencesof just a few workers.
If estimates of aggregate investment in training cue desired, these workers must be selected
. --- .
- ....
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randomly. Information on the subject of training and the reason why it has been. undertaken
is highly desirable (see next section for a draft of possible questions on the subject of and reason
for the 1eoming activity). A full range of data on the background and previous irainJng of the
sampled worlcen is also necessary. It will general1y be desirable to ask about a pair of workers
so that comparisons which hold firm and job constant are possible.
~
example of such a
survey which was recently conducted with members of the NaJional Federation of IndependenJ
Business can be found in Appendix B.
1.5 What We Need to Know about Trends in Learning On-The-Job?
Even though less than 10 percent of the time that workers spend 1eoming how to do the
job better is spent in fonnal training programs, questions are seldom asked about the infonnal
ways workers leam their job. As a result, the research conducted in the past has focused on just
01U!species of tree not the forest. The way to study the entire forest--on-the-job 1eoming--is to
ask questions about "learning"rather than about "taking training". We also need to know much
more about what is being taughtjleamed and why finns/workers are engaging in the 1eoming
activity. For surveys o/individuals (such as the CPS, SIPp, NLSY, HSB and PSID), I propose
questions that are structured like the foUowing:
(1) "Workers can improve their skills and productivity in a variety of ways: [GIVE CARD]
AT A SCHOOL,
FORMAL TRAINING PROVIDED BY MY EMPLOYER,
A SUPERVISOR EXPLAINS/SHOWS HOW CERTAIN TASKS SHOULD BE DONE,
COWORKERS EXPLAIN/SHOW HOW CERTAIN TASKS SHOULD BE DONE,
WATCHING OTHERS AND ASKING FOR INFORMATION,
LEARNING ON MY OWN FROM A MANUAL OR SELF TEACHING DEVICE
LEARNING BY TRIAL AND ERROR OR EXPERIENCE."
During the last year, did you participate in any of these forms of learning?
NO [Skip to Question 4J YES [Do Question la, lb, Ie and 2J
[For each method of learning ask]
la) About bow many bours did you spend AT WORK OR ON COMPANY TIME in this learning
activity during tbe last year?
Ib) About how many hours did you spend NOT ON COMPANY TIME in this learning activity during
the last year?
lc) What did you learn about? Please take a look at this card and indicate which if any of these
things you learned about. Check all that apply.
a) about a new product or service of the company
-b) how to operate new equipment (or old equipment better)
-c) how to repair new equipment (or old equipment better)
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_d) a new computer program or upgraded skill at using computer program
_e) about statistical process control or total quality
f) about working as a team or group problem solving
g) about the competitive environment, the company's [mancial situation or long term strategy.
_h) about a new company information system (eg. for tracking inventory or scheduling)
_i) about blueprint reading, geometric tolerencing, etc.
~) how to be a more effective sales person
-
k) about my company's pensionsjbenefits or [mancial planning
I) to read better
- m) how to make better oral presentations
- n) mathematics (what type of math
0) how to be a better supervisor
-p) safety procedures
q) Courses in your profession or discipline (describe
-r) how to do my job better (activity not listed above)(describe
s) other (explain )
)
)
)
(2) What event stimulated the company to provide the training or you to learn the skills on your own?
(Check all that apply)
a) I started work at a new employer in a new occupation
-b) I started work at a new employer without changing my occupation
-c) I was promoted (or preparing for a promotion)
-d) I was transferred to a new work group (or seeking transfer)
-e) The company introduced a new product or service
- f) New equipment or computer program was introduced at the company
g) I am part of a team where we are supposed to cross train each other
h) Management or work site was reorganized
=i) Necessary to comply with new governmental regulations (eg EEO, safety, environmental)
~) General need to upgrade my skills
-
k) Desire to become better informed about company and the industry
I) Desire to become better informed about my rights
- m) Negotiated outcome of our union contract
n) OTHER (please explain)
_0) Don't Know
(3) What share of the skills you learned in the last year are usefuJat other employers in your local labor market
and would help you get a good job if you were to leave your current employer?
a) Over 90 percent d) Between 30 and 49 percent
b) Between 70 and 89 percent e) Between 10 and 29 percent
c) Between 50 and 69 percent f) Less than 10 percent
(4) Do you work by yourself or as part of a work group or team?
a) work entirely on my own [skip to question 5]
b) I am always part of a work group [Please answer questions 4a and 4b]
c) I am sometimes a part of a work group [Please answer questions 4a and 4b]
(4a) How many people are in the work group?
(4b) What is your role in the group? [check all that apply]
-
Its supervisor
senior member
a leader or facilitator
member
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-
specialized function (describe)
(5) By approximately how much has your Individual productivity increased (declined) since this date last year?
a) no change
-
% increase
-
% decrease Don't Know
(6) By approximately how much has your work group's productivity increased (declined) since this date last year?
a) no change % increase % decrease Don't Know
(7) Was the learning/training you experienced during the year responsible for some or all of these changes in
productivity?
_NO [Skip to Question 8] _YES [Answer Questions 7a or 7b and 6c and 6d]
By approximately how much did the learning/training you
productivity? 7a) The effect on individual productivitywas:
no change % increase % decrease
7b) The effect on work group.productivitywas:
no change
-
% increase
-
% decrease
experienced during the last year change
Don't Know
Don't Know
(7c) Which of the learning experiences described in answer to question 1 was primarily responsible for
this productivity change?-
(7d) What event (or events) listed in answer to question 2 stimulated the training/learning response
which was primarily responsible for this productivity change?
(8) By how much has your hourly wage or monthly salary (unadjusted for inflation and taxes) increased
(declined) since this date last year?
a) no change -._% increase . % decrease Don"t know
(9) During the last year did you make any suggestions for improving productivity, quality or sales at your
current employer.
_NO [skip to Question 10] _YES [Answer Question 9a to 9d]
9a) How many suggestions did you make?-
9b) How many were implemented?-
9c) For the best idea that was implemented, How much did sales increase, productivity rise or
quality improve as a result of implementing your idea? [select the appropriate format and
answer only one of the lines below]
The establishment's sales went up by $
My individual productivity rose percent.
My work group's productivity rose
-
percent.
The enterprise reduced costs by $ per year (holding output constant).
The enterprise's value added (output net of materials and labor costs) rose $
Defects in my output fell from ~rcent to ~rcent.
Defects in my work group's output fell from ~rcent to ~rcent.
[OTHER]
/year
Iyr.
9d) Which of the following events contributed to (or were necessary for) your coming up with
this best idea? [check all that apply]
Informal conversation with other member(s) of my work group
- Informal conversation with a supplier
- Informal conversation with a customer
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Informal conversation with an employee of one of our competitors:
- Informal conversation with some one else. WHO?
= Formal problem solving meeting or quality circle at workInformal training I received on this job
= Experience on this jobFormal training I received on this job
= Formal off job training arranged and paid for by my employerFormal Training received on a previous job
- Experience from my previous jobs
- Courses I took on my own time at a school or college while employed here (if yes
- did your employer pay the tuition costs of these courses
-
Yes _No.)
-
Courses I took in school or college prior to obtaining this job
Reading, thinking and experimenting I did while at work
= Reading and thinking I did while away from workOther describe
The responses to these training/leamin questions should be part of a swvey thaJ also
gets information on: occupation, industry, tenure, wage rate, weekly hours, establishment size,
educational aJtainment, coOege major, and past formal occuPational training. A set of
questions like the above should be rePeated with no change in wording every 4 years or so in
the CPS. This would provide the nation with a means of tracking changes over time in the
quantily, content, character, and consequences of on-the-job learning. If the list of training
topics were refined and expanded, the periodic surveys might be able to provide trend data on
the introduction of sPeCiJk organizational innovations like Statistical Process Control and Total
QuoliJy Management for the economy as a whole. It would be highly desirable for this swvey
instrument to be administered in other countries as well as in the U.S. Someone shou1d be
assigned the responsibiJiLy of working with other countries to develop a standardized way of
asking representative samples of workers about on-the-job leaming and training.
2. WHY DO GERMAN AND JAPANESE WORKERS RECEIVE MORE TRAINING
THAN AMERICAN WORKERS ?
In the United States, only 33 percent of workers with 1 to 5 years of tenure report having received skill
improvement training from their current employer (Hollenbeck and Wilkie 1985). Analyzing 1982 NLS-Youth
data. Parsons (1985) reports that only 34 to 40 percent of the young workers in clerical, operative, service and
laborer jobs reported that it was "very true" that "the skills [I am] learning would be valuable in getting a better
job." The payoffs to getting jobs which offer training appear to be very high, however. In Parson's study, having
a high learning job rather than a no learning job in 1979 increased a male youth's 1982 wage rate by 13.7 percent.
TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF JOB TENURE
Under Under Over Over
One Yr TwoYrs 5Yrs 10 Yrs
United States (1951) 29.0% 38.1% 35.6% 19.8%
(1%3) 24.5 33.2 46.1 34.5
(1%6) 15.9 25.4 43.0 28.9
(1%8) 16.9 28.2 43.8 28.7
(1978) 18.2 29.9 39.9 23.2
(1981) 27.7 39.3 39.5 23.6
United States (1983) 27.3 38.5 39.6 27.2
(1987) 28.8 40.1 40.5 26.7
Australia (1981) 25.0 38.8 37.2 19.4
Belgium (1972) 24.8 51.1 31.4
Canada (1983) 22.7 33.1 453 26.6
France (1978) 17.8 62.5 35.1
(1984) 57.5 36.0
Germany (1972) 25.0 51.0 34.5
(1985) 18.6 63.0 42.1
Italy (1972) 20.0 49.7 28.0
Japan (1982) 9.8 21.2 66.8 48.0
Luxembourg (1972) 22.6 58.1 41.6
Netherlands (1972) 25.2 50.3 32.1
United Kingdom (1979) 13.8 24.4 52.4 30.5
(1984) 51.8 29.8
Source: OECD 1984, Table 32; Bnechveman and Standridge 1991; Hamel 1%3, 1%7; Hayghe 1974; Horvath
1982; O'Boyle 1%8; Sekscenski 1979; BLS Jan 1987)
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While the 1980 job had no such effect, the 1981 job raised wages by 7:1.percent when it was a high learning job
rather than a no learning job. If the payoffs to such jobs are so substantial, why aren't such jobs more common?
The Japanese and German economies apparently generate a significantly larger num~r of jobs which
offer substantial training on-the-job. Why does this occur? This section of the report reviews the evidence on
the culpability of five prime suspects: high turnover, high costs of capital, lower trainability of American workers,
lower rates of technological progress, and the absence of government sponsored signals of skills obtained from
training on-the-job.
2.1 Turnover
If American employers were asked why they do not provide more intensive training to young workers,
they would probably point to the high turnover rates of youth as the primary reason. And indeed, while some
American workers stay at their employer for many years, most workers change employers very frequently. Table
1 presents data on how the distribution of job tenure varies across nations. In the early 1980s, only 40 percent
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of American workers had been on their current job for more than 5 years. With the exception ofAustraIia, no
other nation had such a low proportion of long tenure employees. The comparable proportions were 66.8
percent for Japan, 63 percent for Germany, 57.5 percent for France, 453 percent for Canada, and 50 to 52
percent for Belgium, Holland and the United Kingdom.For American workers with less than one year of tenure,
the probability of a separation in the next 12 months is 59 percent. Since comparably defmed turnover is only
20 percent in the United Kingdom and 24 percent in Japan, national differences in turnover could be a major
reason for the low levels of training investment in the US, if the employer's explanation is right (OECD, 1984,
Table 33 and 34).
Turnover effects the stock of trained workers in three ways. First, high turnover necessarily implies that
a given rate of investment in fIrm specific skills yields a smaller stock of workers with fIrm specific skills. Many
of those trained have moved on to other fIrms where the fIrm specific components of training yield no benefits.
Second, turnover has a powerful effect on employer decisions to provide training to employees.
Employers, not workers, fmance most of the training that is undertaken in US fIrmS (see section 3.5). Employers
will not invest in training unless they believe it will generate a monthly return that exceeds the sum of the
monthly turnover rate (generally above 2% per month in the US and sometimes greater than 8%jmo.) and the
cost of capital (which is about 1.5 percent per month or 18% per year). Monthly turnover rates are typically
much larger than the cost of capital and are also much more variable. If turnover is 5% per month and the cost
of capital is 1.5% per month, the cash flow yield of the training investment rate of return must exceed 78 percent
per year if the investment is to make economic sense. Even when turnover is very low, 2 percent per month,
required cash flow yield is still quite high: 42 percent per year. Training, thus becomes a sensible investment
for an American employer only when it yields very rapid and very large returns. The amount of training
employers are willing to fmance is negatively related to the projected turnover rate of the trainees.
The third reason why turnover is so critical is its impact on the process of teaching and learning.
Turnover disrupts learning regardless of whether the skills being learned are generic or fIrm specific. Schools
teach general skills and follow a common curriculum, yet have great difficulty when students transfer from one
school to another during the school year. Teaching must be adjusted to the special needs of the learner, and
it takes time for the teacher to learn of those special needs. Learning occurs best when instructor and learner
have a close personal relationship and it takes time to build such relationships. Turnover is thus one of the
determinants of the efficiency of the learning production function.
The high rates of turnover in America, then, help explain why investments in on-the-job training are
lower in this country than in Japan and Germany. More research is needed on the impact of expected
turnover rates on investments in employer training and on the effect of turnover on the efficiency
of the learning production function.
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Whv Is Turnover so Hi2h in the United States? : One important reason why turnover is so high in the
US youth labor market is job shopping and tryout hiring. When the match is first arranged. both. the employer
and the job seeker are poorly informed about each other, so they spend the first months learning about each
Other and. if they do not like what they discover, they terminate the relationship. If they knew more about each
other prior to the hiring and acceptance decision, there would be fewer surprises, fewer quits and fewer
dismissals. There are good reasons why try out hiring is so prevalent in the US. There are major institutional
barriers to the free flow of information about job applicants--such as EEO testing guidelines, the failure of high
schools to send out transcripts and the threat of law suits if bad recommendations are given--that do not exist
in other countries. German and Japanese employers are much more careful in their selection of blue collar and
clerical employees than American employers (Rosenbaum and Kariya 1987; Koenig 1987).
A second reason why turnover is higher in the US is that there are fewer legal and contractual obstacles
to layoffs in the US (Sengenberger 1985; F1anagan 1986). Thirdly, turnover appears to be less costly for young
American workers than for young German and young Japanese workers. It has already been noted that specific
training is more extensive in Japan, and the loss of these investments is a disincentive to turnover. Transition
costs also discourage turnover (Bishop and Kang 1988) and there is reason to believe that there may be
differences across countries in the magnitude of these transition costs. In some countries, quitting or being laid
off does serious damage to the worker's reputation and the likelihood of finding another good job. The best
Japanese employers hire straight out of high school and are reported to discriminate against those with work
experience. The reverse appears to prevail in the US. Quitting appears to be much less stigmatizing in the US
than in Japan particularly for young workers.
In Germany, apprenticeships have a three month probationary period during which either party may opt
out of the contract without serious consequences. Nevertheless, only 5 percent of apprentices change employers
during this period. An apprentice who quits his apprenticeship after the probationary period will fmd it very
difficult to get another one. As a result, about 95 percent of those who fmish the first 3 months of their
apprenticeship stick with it for the full three years and pass the performance exam that comes at the end. While,
apprentices are not subject to layoff when there is slack work, journeymen are. Who is laid off is often based
on job performance not seniority, so being laid off is more stigmatizing than it is in the US. To protect
themselves from this stigma, German workers bargain for employment contracts which reduce the probability
of layoffs by front loading compensation and mandating severance pay.
The result is lower turnover, a higher payoff to employer investments in specific and general training,
greater training investment and, as a result, strong productivity growth.
2.2 Cost of Capital
Turnover is not the only reason for the low levels of training investment in the United States. The
benefits of training often take a while to be realized. Companies are less willingto make long term investments
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of all kinds when the cost of capital is high. Because of the large budget deficit and low savings' rate, costs of
capital are particularly high in the US, so long term (raining investments are discouraged. German and Japanese
corporationS face lower costs of capital (OTA 1990a), and this is one of the reasons why they invest so heavily
in training. When they move production abroad they take this practice with them. Japanese corporations
operating in the US spend a good deal more on training than American companies in the same industry provide
(Mincer and Higuchi 1988).
2.3 Trainability or Workers
Levels: According to the National Assessment of Education (1988b) 93 percent of American 17 year
olds do not have "the capacity to apply mathematical operations in a variety of problem settings (p. 42)." Young
school leavers in Germany and Japan have a considerably better general education than their American
counterparts. This means that they do not require remedial instruction in reading and mathematics, learn new
skills more rapid1y, and require less instruction to achieve a given level of competence. They are more likely to
be able to learn by doing or by reading.5 With a less capable work force, employers feel they are less able to
introduce technologies and methods of operation (eg. small-lot production and flexible manufacturing systems)
which require that workers be both highly trained and cross trained in a variety of skills (Weiss 1984, Prais 1989).
Rates of Change: Not only are levels of basic skills achievement low in the US; achievement levels of
entering workers actually declined between 1%7 and 1980. While basic skills have stagnated in the U.S., they
have been dramatically improving in Europe and East Asia. As the learning ability and academic background
of a workforce increases, technological progress becomes more rapid and optimal level of investment in
equipment and training increase as well. More research is needed on the impact of worker trainability
on the productivity of investments in training and on incentives to invest in training.
2.4 Lower Rates or Technological Progress
Studies by Mincer and Higuchi (1988), Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987) and Tan et al (1991) have found
that workers in industries experiencing high rates of technological progress receive more training than workers
in industries with low rates of technological progress. This fmding is consistent with a view that heavy
investments in training cause increases in productivity but it is also consistent with a view that causation also runs
in the opposite direction--high rates of investment and technological progress increase the demand for and the
profitability of training. Because the U.S. had such a large productivity lead at the end of the Second World
War, American productivity growth in the postwar period has necessarily been below that of Germany and Japan.
This has no doubt contributed to the lower level of training investment in the US. However, not all of the
growth rate gap is due to this catch up phenomenon.
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2.5 Transmitting Information about a Worker's General Skills
In the U.S. labor market, hiring decision makers have a very difficult time assessing the 'quality of the
general human capital obtained from on-the-job training. This fact increases tW'Dover, lowers wages, and lowers
productivity. Since part of the reason forgetting general training is to improve the worker's marketability with
other employers, not recognizing the benefits of this training reduces the incentive to invest in general on-the-job
training~ Doing an especially good job of training employees will benefit the trained workers when they leave
the firm only if the rum develops a reputation for being a good trainer.7 Past experience with the former
employees of a rum is probably the primary determinant of a firm's reputation as a trainer. Large firms that
twu over a reasonable share of their trainees are likely to develop a reputation (good or bad) for the training
that they provide. It is well known, for instance, that mM and General Electric provide excellent training to
their newly recruited junior executives. This positive reputation helps their separating employees find better jobs,
and this in tW'D helps the firm recruit the best possible candidates when it is hiring. Even though a good
reputation as a trainer forces them to pay higher wages in the post -training period, most firms have a strong
interest in establishing such a reputation. The armed forces are aware of this, and consequently spend millions
of dollars advertising the quality and civilian usefulness of their training.
Most young workers without a baccalaureate degree, however, do not obtain jobs at the large firms with
established training reputations. The smaller less well known firms where they find their first job are typically
unknown quantities when it comes to the quality and general usefulness of their training.
The lack of full reward for improvements in general skills if one leaves one's current employer effects
the incentives for the trainer and trainee to devote time and energy to learning general skills. The higher the
worker's likelihood of leaving the rum, the lower is that worker's incentive to devote himself or herself to
learning general (or specific) skills that are not immediately visible to other employers. This means that the
under investment in general OJT is greatest for temporary and seasonal employees and for young people as a
group.
The poor quality of the information about a job candidate's general skills and the resulting under
investment in general training (both on the job and in schools) is a major institutional flaw of U.S. labor markets.
Formal systems for certifying the competencies gained through on-the-job training exist in the United States, but
they have not achieved the widespread usage they deserve. The apprenticeship systems of Switzerland, Austria,
and Germany are probably the best examples in the world of widespread and effective systems of on-the-job
training and competency certification. One of the most important features of these apprenticeship systems is
the requirement that the apprentice pass written and practical examinations covering the occupation's curriculum.
If an employer cannot provide training in all the skills included in the curriculum, it is must arrange for their
apprentices to receive instruction at another firm or at a special employer-run school. The examinations are- set
and scored by a local committee of masters (skilled workers) and employers so the quality of the training
provided by the master and the firm is put to a public test. Passing this apprenticeship exam is of benefit not
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only to the trainee, it is important to the masters as well, for both their reputation amongst their peers and their
ability to recruit high-quality apprentices depends upon it. As a result, 90 percent of German apprentices remain
at one employer for the full 3-year apprenticeship period, and 90 percent of these pass their test (on the first
or second try). The apprenticeship systems of the English-speaking nations are based on time served rather than
competencies achieved and are considerably less successful in standardizing and upgrading the training that
occurs.
The examination at the end of the training process is the key to maintaining quality control. In the late
19th century, the Swiss educational/training system went through a period of aises and self-examination not
unlike what is now happening in the United States and the United Kingdom. The nation had to export to survive
but the quality of workmanship was low and deteriorating. The Swiss assigned blame to their apprenticeship
system and proceeded to reform it by ending apprenticeship based on time served, establishing a standardized
curriculum, and instituting written and practical examinations set by local committees of employers and workers.
The high standards of workmanship for which Swiss workers are renowned are not an inherent trait of national
character but rather are the consequence of the institutions that teach, test, certify, and publicize this
workmanship.
The standardized curriculums and the proficiency exam at the end of the apprenticeship mean that the
quality and nature of the training is well signaled to employers in Germany, Switzerland and Austria. The result
is that the worker can count on benefiting from doing a good job in their apprenticeship even if the training
employer does not keep them on. Since the future payoff is certain, German apprentices are willing to start out
at a wage that is only about one-quarter of the wage they will be able to command at the end of the
apprenticeship. If the apprentices were adults, they could not afford to accept so Iowa wage. They are,
however, teenagers who because they live at home are heavily subsidized by their parents. Consequently, the
liquidity constraint that is such a barrier to heavy investments in general training in the US is much less of a
problemin Germany.More research is needed on the impact of credentialing systems on the payoff
to training, on turnover, and on the wi1lingne.uof worken to engage in training.
In summary, there are a number of very good reasons why American employers invest less in training
than employers in Japan and Germany. This does not necessarily imply, however, that the differential is caused
by some failure of the American training market that requires remedy. Whether or not the American training
market is failing to provide the socially optimal level of training is a different issue; one to which we will now
turn.
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3. FROM SOCIETY'S POINT OF VIEW
800 MOST US EMPLOYERS AND WORKERS UNDERINVEST IN ON.mE.JOB TRAINING?"
This section of the paper presents a preliminary review of what is known about whether the training
market in the United States is failing to provide a socially optimal quantity and quality of employer training.
Four potential sources of market failure--rea1 externalities. tax induced distortions, liquidity constraints and
government regulatory interventions which discourage training--are examined. Each of them are found to
operate to some degree in some training markets. Then, empirical evidence on the market failure issue is
examined in section 3.5 and 3.6. There appears to be a good deal of evidence that employers are sharing the
costs and benefits of general training with employees. If so, the socially optimal level of training is likely to be
greater than the level chosen by profit maximizing firms.
3.1 Real Externalities
The primary justification for public control and subsidy of schooling and public involvement in other
forms of education and training is the fact that the individual who gets the education and training receives only
part of its benefits. When deciding on the type and amount of education and training to undertake and how hard
to study while at schoo~ most individuals are taking only private benefits into account. The private benefits of
an educational experience are many: the enjoyment derived from being a student or pleasing mom and dad, the
higher after-tax income, the prestige and consumption benefits of having an education (or a job that requires
heavy on-the-job training), the private benefits of improved health, and so forth. These private benefits account
for only part of the total benefits to society of education and training, however. People who have received more
or better education and training or who achieved more during the experience benefit others in society by paying
higher taxes, by making discoveries or artistic contributions that benefit others in the society, by being more likely
to give time and money to charity, by being less likely to experience long periods of hospitalization that are paid
for by insurance or government, and in many other ways (Haveman and Wolfe 1983). Economists call social
benefits such as these "spillovers" or "externalities." Private decisions will lead to an insufficient quantity and
insufficient quality of education and training and insufficient achievement by students, unless public agencies
intervene and partialIy subsidize the cost or add to the rewards. The appropriate amount of public subsidy is
closely related to the size of the spillover or externality benefits of education and training. Training produces
two kinds of real externalities:
Poor Si2DalIing of General Skills to Other Employers-- The training provided by one employer benefits
other employers and consumers, not just the trainee and his/her employer (Bishop 1989). The worker is more
productive in future jobs, but these employers do not perceive accurately the quality of the general OJT received
by the worker and, as a result, do not fuIly compensate the trained worker for their higher productivity. Bishop's
(1991) study of the relative productivity and the profitability of new hires obtained results that are consistent with
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this hypothesis. New hires who had received formal off-job training sponsored by a previous employer made
significantly more suggestions designed to improve productivity, were more productive and profitable and were
less likely to be fired. If otie accepts these findings as valid, the implication is a market failure which reduces
the payoff to worker investments in OJT. The ultimate cause of this problem is the lack of effective signals of
the quantity and quality of training.
Discoveries and Disasters Attributable to Traininr: High quality training benefits customers and the
public as well as the trainer and the trainee. When, for example, the dancers of the New York City Ballet
receive excellent training, the company benefits through greater ticket revenue but the audience benefits as well
because they derive a larger consumer surplus from the performance. The COMSA T employee who figured out
how to double the lifetime of communication satellites by judicious use of the rocket fuel remaining on board,
benefitted customers and competitors at least as much as he benefitted COMSA T. The Aloha airlines pilot who
landed his plane after an explosive decompression and the loss of a major section of his plane, certainly raised
the lifetime earnings of his passengers. On-the-job training and experience were critical to the COMSAT
discovery and the safe landing of the Aloha plane.
When a worker screws up because of poor training, the customers and the general public often lose just
as much as the worker and the company. Examples of disasters caused or contributed to by poor training are
legion: Chemoble, Three Mile Island, Exxon Valdez, the shoot down of the Korean Airlines 747 (pilot error
caused the plane to be off course), and Greyhound bus crashes in New York State. Tort law internalize some
but not all of these costs. A study of egregious physician errors in New York State found that only one-eighth
of them resulted in a malpractice claim. Damage awards are typically paid by insurance funds that are
imperfectly experience rated. Where the public interest in insuring top quality training is manifest to all, training
is often regulated or subsidized by government. The Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of
Transportation and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, for example, engage in such regulation.
However, for every big discovery or disaster that gets media attention and generates a political response,
there are millions of little discoveries, un rewarded services, or unanticipated product failures that directly effect
consumers that do not generate political responses. Since customers lack low cost access to accurate information
on the quality of what they are buying, the prices paid do not fullyreflect quality differentials between different
providers. As a consequence, training which enhances quality and reliability often generates benefits for
customers which are not recognized or rewarded by the market. This is a controversial proposition. It
would be desirable to fund a top theorist (eg. Nalebuff, Stigler or Akerloff) to aamine the
assumptions about the cost and quality of infonnalion about the quality of general training and
the quality of goods are necessary to justify the standard assumption that all of the benefits of
training are received by eiJherthe worker or the firm.
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3.2 Tax Induced Distortions of the Training Market
Tbe Non-Deductibility of Some Training Expenses--The benefits of training are taxed, bl,ltnot all of the
costs are deductible.' Some of the time that trainees devote to employer sponsored trainin& comes from
reducing leisure time. Employees taking job related college courses typicallyattend classes on their own time
and always do their homework on their own time. Japanese workers frequently take correspondence courses
related to their job and, when they are rotated to a new job, the meticulous description of how the job is done
written by its previous occupant is studied at home. Japanese supervisors are expected to fill up slack time with
training. When Ronald Dore presented his passport at an out of the way port of entry that seldom sees British
passports, the supervisor called his younger colleagues over and taught them about its intricacies while Dore
looked on. This little training session delayed passengers somewhat and necessitated a sacrifice of on-the-job
leisure but output --the number of passengers processed--did not change. Incentives to undertake training are
distorted if government does not share in the costs of training to the same degree it shares in its rewards. When
training time substitutes for leisure time, that is what happens.
It wou1d, therefore, be very desirable to laww more about the alent to which the time
devoted to on-the-job leaming results in a soaifia of leiszue either on or off the job. Interviews
focussing on-the-job leaming/training should therefore ask about what was sacrificed in order
to undertake the leaming activity.
The PrO!!fessive Income Tax: The second tax induced distortion arises from the fact that investments
in OJT are typically made at a time when the individual has no tax liability or a lower-then-normal marginal tax
rate and the benefits are received when earnings and marginal tax rates are higher. As a result, the after-tax
benefits of an OJT investment are reduced more than the after-tax costs and such investments are discouraged.
rU'Dls, on the other hand, train continuously, so the marginal tax rates faced when the costs of training are
incurred and deductible are no different from those faced during the payoff period.
3.3 High Borrowing Costs and Uquidity Constraints
Tbe third reason why society subsidizes schooling is the failure of the free market (in the absence of
publicly funded loan guarantee programs) to offer loans to young persons seeking to invest in their education.
The government recognized long ago that people going to school needed access to low-interest, government-
guaranteed loans. Workers investing in general on-the-job training have a similar need but are not eligible for
such loans unless they happen to be part of a training program run by an accredited educational institution.
Because of the fear of turnover, employers are reluctant to pay for general training that is visible and useful in
other firms. If the employer is not willing to pay for general training, it will be offered onJy to those workers
who pay for it by accepting a lower wage during the training period than could be obtained elsewhere. The more
intensive the training, the greater the required reduction in wages will have to be. Many workers are unwilling
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to accept a large reduction in their current standard of living, and, since they are unable to borrow 'at reasonable
interest rates, they forego the investments in general on-the-job training~ If they do fund such investments, they
do so only if extremely high rates of return are obtained.
Most young workers are liquidity constrained--that is they are unable to shift as much consumption from
the future into the present as they would like because they have neither assets which can be depleted nor access
to credit at reasonable terms. Half of households headed by someone under the age of 25 have less than $746
in financial assets and 19 percent have no financial assets at all. Half of households headed by someone between
25 and 34 have less than $1514 in fmancial assets and 13 percent have none (Survey of Consumer Fmances 1984).
Subsidized or guaranteed student loans are not available to finance on-the-job training and banks will not lend
money for this purpose without collateral. Borrowing against the equity in one's home is a possibility for some
but only 34 percent of households with heads under the age of 35 own a home and many of the houses have been
owned for only a short while, so the equity that can be borrowed against is small. Even with collateral, the loans
available to individuals usually carry higher interest rates than those charged businesses. Studies of the
willingness of consumers to substitute consumption over time have all concluded that the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution is no higher than one and most studies conclude it is .5 or below (Friend and Blume 1975; Hall
1988; Hubbard and Judd 1986). A substitution elasticity of .5 implies that reducing a liquidity constrained
worker's wage by one half (in order to pay for general training) roughly quadruples the worker's marginal utility
of consumption. Such a worker would be willing to give up four dollars of future income in return for one dollar
of current income. The liquidity constraint phenomenon has little effect on the wage profIle of jobs requiring
no general training and which, therefore, have a flat productivity profIle. Where significant general training is
occurring, however, it comes into play and may result in an employment contract in which the employer shares
the costs of general training (Glick and Feuer 1984; Feuer, Glick and Desai 1987).
Firms are thus more willing than workers to trade off future earnings for present earnings. The
compensation packages that result from the asymmetric access to capital markets and the progressive tax
structure reflect the worker's strong preference for compensation now rather than later. In effect, firms offer
new hires a loan that will be canceled if a separation occurs. FU1I1Sdo not require repayment of the loan when
separations occur for the same reasons that banks do not offer large unsecured loans without a government
guarantee of payment. The administrative costs of obtaining repayment are extremely high and bankruptcy is
a real option for someone with zero assets. FU1I1S,however, undertake to fmance some of the costs of general
OJT only when their investment yields a return that is sufficient to pay for both the cost of capital and the risk
of turnover. This reduces employer investments in general on-the-job training below the level that would have
prevailed if workers were able to borrow at the same interest rates as employers.
28
3.4 Repairing Government Created Distortions
A fourth justification of public efforts to encourage greater on-the-job training is to undo the damage
done by other government interv~ntions in the labor market which discourage on-the-job tr~. With respect
to investments in on-the-job training, the two most significant such interventions are the minimum wage and
barriers to employer use of basic skills tests and high school grades as devices for selecting new workers.
Minimum Wage--The minimum wage prevents unskilled American workers from offering to pay for
general training by accepting a sub-minimum wage during the training period. Providing training to a new
employee is costly. The new employee is not very productive at first, and other workers must take time away
from their regular activities to give instruction to the new hire. Many of the skiUs that the new employee learns
have application in other firms as wen. To avoid losing the worker to another firm, the employer that is
providing the training must raise the wage as the trainee's productivity increases. Jobs that offer training and
the prospect of future wage increases are more attractive than those that do not. The competition for these jobs
will enable employers offering general training to obtain workers at lower wage rates.
Minimum wage legislation, however, prevents wage rates from falling below the legislated monetary
figure. Lacking the ability to get new employees to pay a major share of the costs of general training (by
accepting a low wage during the training period), employers will adopt production technologies that minimize
the ski1I requirements of the job. The evolution of the diner and the small, family-operated restaurant into
franchised fast food operations using specially designed machines and prepackaged food is an example of how
this is accomplished. By reducing the skills required to do the job, the employer shortens the time it takes for
new employees to reach maximum productivity. The same people may have the job but they are taught less, and
what is taught is useful only in that fInn--not elsewhere. Opportunities for promotion are minimal and wage
increases are small or nonexistent.
A second impact of the minimum wage is that the forced increase in the starting wage is partially
compensated for by a fall in wage rates during the post-training period. This increases the quit rate, which in
turn reduces the payoffs that employers receive from training and, therefore, their willingness to make such
investments or to hire individuals who require substantial training investments. The predictions of theory have
been conflJ'Dled by at least two studies (HashUnoto 1982, Leighton and Mincer 1981). More research on the
impact of the minimum wage on training on-the-job is needed.
Barriers to Careful Selection of Entry Level Workers--Govemmental institutions and regulations are an
important reason why American employers do a poor job of selecting entry level workers and experience very
high rates of turnover. Employers are not able to obtain good information on the skills and competencies of
young job applicants. Employers believe that school performance is a good predictor of job performan~e'o,
but they have great difficulty getting such information. If a student or graduate has given written permission for
a transcript to be sent to an employer, the Federal Education Rights and Privacy Act obligates the school to
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respond Many high schools are not, however, responding to such requests. In Columbus Ohio; for example,
Nationwide Insurance sent over 1,200 requests for transcripts signed by Job applicants to high schools in 1982
and received only 93 responses.
An additional barrier to the use of high school transcripts in selecting new employees is that when high
schools do respond, it takes a great deal of time. In most high schools, the system for responding to transcript
requests has been designed to meet the needs of college-bound students rather than the students who seek jobs
immediately after graduating. The result is that a 1987 survey of a stratified random sample of small-and
medium-sized employers who were members of the National Federation of Independent Business [NFIB] found
that transcripts had been obtained prior to the selection decision for only 14.2% of the high school graduates
hired.' 1 Only 15% had asked high school graduates to report their grade point average. The absence of
questions about grades from most job applications reflects the low reliability of self reported data, the difficulties
of verifying it, and the fear of EEO challenges to such questions.
Hiring on the basis of recommendations by high school teachers is also uncommon. In the NFIB survey,
when a high school graduate was hired, the new hire had been referred or recommended by vocational teachers
in only 5.2% of the cases and referred by someone else in the high school in only 2.7%.
Tests are available for measuring competency in reading, writing, mathematics, science, and problem
solving, but, after the 1971 Griggs decision, almost all firms were forced to stop employment testing by EEOC
guidelines which made it prohibitively costly to demonstrate the validity of tests assessing competence in English
and mathematics.'2 Before such a test could be used, the firm had to conduct a very expensive validity study
of the proposed test and alternative tests at their own work sites. Separate studies had to be done for men and
women, blacks, hispanics and whites. Most flTlDsdid not have enough workers in each category to do a reliable
study (Friedman and Williams 1982). Litigation costs and the potential liability are substantial. Using an event
study methodology, JoDi Hersch (1991) found that corporations that were the target of a class action
discrimination suit that was important enough to appear in the Wall Street Journal experienced a 15 percent
decline in their market value during the 61 day period surrounding the announcement of the suit. Companies
became extremely cautious about testing and the result was to greatly diminish the use of tests for employee
selection. A 1987 survey of the membership of the National Federation of Independent Business found that basic
skills tests had been given in only 2.9 % of the hiring decisions studied.
Other countries handle the signaling of high school accomplishments to prospective employers much
more effectively and have much lower turnover rates as a result. More research is needed on the impact
of governmental restrictions on the flow of information about the qualifications of young workers
on turnover rates.
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3.5 Evidence of Underinvestment from the High Rates of Return to OJT
If there is underinvestment in general OJT, we would expect to find private rates of return to OJT to
be very high. The studies that have estimated the wage return to OJT investments by workers find that rates
of return are very high. For instance, after adjusting for inflation, the real rate of return to OJT investments by
the worker was 12.6 percent per year for those who went to college and 19 percent for those who did not attend
college (Rosen 1982). These rates of return are considerably higher than the real rates of return of about 4
percent on corporate bonds and of about 5 percent for schooling. Some estimates of rates of return to training
are even higher (Mincer 1974, 1989). These efforts are fraught with difficulties, however, because it is very
difficult (a) to measure what employees [as opposed to employers] invest in training and (b) to distinguish wage
increases caused by training from wage increases caused by selective turnover or the need to discourage shirking
by back-loading compensation packages.'3 The total returns to employer and employee investments (both
general and firm specific) have not been evaluated because data on productivity effects was lacking. If credible
and reliable estimates of rates of return to training (either the wage returns received by workers
01' the productivity returns shared by firms and worlcer.s)could be obtained, funding such
research would be very worthwhile, even if costs were very high. The results would tell us alot
about whether training is wulerprovided. For the reasons cited in section 1.2, however, I am
quite pessimistic that such a study is feasible.
3.5 Do Employers Share the Costs of General Training?
An easier way to empirically examine the issue of the underprovision of training is to study whether the
training market indeed behaves in the way predicted by standard theory. The theory of on-the-job training says
that for general training, the worker pays the full costs of the training by accepting a lower wage rate while
training is underway and then reaps the full benefits in the form of a higher wage rate regardless of whether
there is subsequent turnover. Is this correct: Do workers pay all the costs of and receive all the benefits of
training in skills that are useful at other firms? If it is false and employers are being induced to share the
costs of general training by the prospect of sharing its benefits, underprovision of general training is probable.
It probably means that workers are liquidity constrained or that general skills are poorly signaled to the labor
market. If employers are paying some of the costs of general training. they are not doing it for altruistic reasons.
They are comparing the productivity benefits the fJJ1l1will receive if the worker stays at the fum to the training
costs they are incurring. Benefits received by other employers and by the trainee will have zero weight in their
calculation. Turnover, thus, causes the firm to take only a portion of the true social benefits of general training
into account and underprovision results. Therefore, it is important to determine wbetber employers are sharing
the ~ts of general training. What do we now know about this issue?
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Cross-section Studies of Startinf!: Watz.e Rates: Standard theory predicts that workers who find jobs
which offer extensive general OJT will receive substantially lower initial wages than workers who take jobs which
do not offer general training. The problem with this prediction is that analyses of large representative data sets
generally fail to confirm it. In Parson's (1985, table 7.6) study, when a youth reported that it was "very true" that
"the skills [I am] learning would be valuable in getting a better job", his job paid on average 2.4 to 14 percent
more than when the above statement was "not at all true" even with an extensive set of controls for schooling
and academic achievement included in the model. Bishop and Kang (1988) have conducted another test of this
hypothesis in the 1984 follow up of the High School and Beyond seniors by regressing the log of the deflated
starting wage of the current or most recent job on indicators of the receipt of employer sponsored training. Here
again, the jobs offering some training rather than none or which offer greater amounts of training paid hi~er
starting wage rates even when a whole array of human capital characteristics were controlled. For females the
positive effect of receiving training on the starting wage was statistically significant. Adding dummies for
occupation and industry did not change the results appreciably. Lillard and Tan's (1986, Table 4.3-4.5) analysis
of NLS Young Mens data and Barron, Black and Loewenstein (1989, Table 2) analysis of EOPP data found no
significant tendency of wages to be lower while training is underway. Point estimates were negative but so small
they might as well be zero from a substantive point of view.
It can be argued, however, that these fmdings do not constitute a decisive refutation of the proposition
that workers pay all of the costs of general training. Maybe the anomalous fmdings are caused by unobserved
heterogeneity. The argument is that hiring decision makers are better at assessing the ability of job candidates
than econometricians with access to NLS or HSB data file and the positive association between wages and
training arises because workers who are highly able (in ways not observed by the analyst) are both paid more
and also recruited for jobs that require large amounts of training.
Unobserved heterogeneity no doubt has the effect of contributing to the positive association between
training and starting wage rates, but to transform a large negative structural relationship into either zero impacts
or statistically significant positive relationships, sorting of more able job applicants into high training jobs would
have to be very powerful indeed. If such a selection process were operating, access to training should depend
on ability factors that are visible to the analyst as well as on factors that are not visible to the analyst. Yet
models estimated by Parsons (1985) and by Bishop and Kang (1988) failed to find large effects of ability proxies
such as test scores, grades, and being a disciplined student on. the probability of receiving training.
Further evidence that unobserved heterogeneity can not explain these anomalous findings comes from
two types of studies which avoid the unobserved heterogeneity problem by holding the individual being trained
constant: (a) detailed studies of the costs of apprenticeship training and who pays these costs and (b)
econometric analyses which compare the productivity growth and wage growth impacts of general training
receivedby the individual.Replications of these studies in other data sets are highly desirable.
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Studies of the Sharin~ of Apprenticeship Costs: Studies of who pays the costs of apprenticeship training
have been conducted in Germany, Great Britain, and the United States (Noll et al1984; Ryan 1980; Jones 1985;
Weiderhold-Fritz 1985). Despite the transferable character of the training and high turnover rates, these studies
concluded that employers made large investments in general training that were not recovered during the
apprenticeship. A welding apprenticeship program at a major U.s. shipyard was the subject of the first of these
studies (Ryan 1980). The wage profile was quite flat--starting at $3.99 and topping out at $5.26 after about two
years on the job--even though the investments in general training were very considerable. Inexperienced new
hires spent 36 days in vesboule training before beginning work. During the first week following vestibule
training, the trainee's output net of repair requirements was less than 10 percent of an experienced worker's
output. Thirty-seven weeks after being hired it reached a level of 55 percent and at 60 weeks a level of 80 percent
of an experienced worker's output. Despite the fact that the local economy was in deep recession, separation
rates were extremely high: 10.8 percent per month for beginners and 6.3 percent per month for those with 12
to 24 months of tenure. The shipyard accounted for about one-fifth of the welding jobs in the area. When
trained welders left the shipyard, they typically found better paying welding jobs at other local employers. This
evidence clearly establishes that the shipbuilding company was contnouting to the costs of general training.
The study of German apprenticeship training by the Bundersinstitut fur Berufsforschung found that in
1980 training costs ranged from a high of 25,200 DM per year for telecommunications technician apprentices to
2400 DM for apprentice gardeners and averaged 10,300 DM or $5668 per year at 1980 exchange rates. The
apprentice's contribution to output, which was netted out to arrive at the above figure, averaged 6700 DM per
year (Weiderhold-Fritz 1985).
Jones's (1985) study of apprentice training in the engineering industry in Great Britain found that the
employer's training costs were 1.31 times the annual payroll costs of a skilled worker and the apprentice's
contribution to output (which was netted out in calculating the estimate of employer costs) was 1.26 times the
payroll costs of a skilled worker. Thus even major upward revisions of these estimates of the apprentice's
contribution to output would not change the basic conclusion that employers appear to be sharing the costs of
general training. Replication of these studies is highly desirable.
Econometric Studies ofthe Productivity and Wa2.e GroWth Effects of Trainin2: Becker's theory predicts
that when training is general, its impact on wage growth should equal or exceed its impact on productivity
p-owth. An analysis of EOPP data on training is presented in Appendix A which contradicts this prediction.
When proportionate rates of wage and productivity groWth during the fust year or two of tenure on a job are
regressed on time spent training the individual, productivity effects are many multiples larger that wage effects
(Bishop forthcoming). How can these puzzling results be explained?
One possible explanation of these anomalous fmdings is that the training is specific to the employer and
the employer is fmancing all of its costs. But standard models of the sharing of tbe costs of specific training do
_/-
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not predict that employers pay all of its costs and some of the new revisionist theories--Salop and Salop's (1976)
adverse selection theory--predict that employers pay none of the costs of specific training. A specific training
explanation of these fmdings is particularly perplexing when to all outward appearances the training is largely
general, as is the case with apprenticeships. In fact in the EOPP study employers were asked how useful the
skills being learned by new employees are at other firms, and most responded that they were quite useful.
When training was done by managers and the skills were reported to be entirely general, doubling training
intensity raised productivity by 6.7 percent but wages by only 0.8 percent in a logarithmic model and raised
productivity by 3 percent while increasing wage growth by only 0.96 percent in a linear model. Replication
33
of this study in other data sets should receive high priority.
Why might it be rational for employers to finance training in skills which they describe as useful at other
firms? One explanation of the phenomenon is that different fmns require different mixes of general skills. The
firm that does the training concentrates on those skills it needs the most, some of which may not be as highly
valued by alternative employers. Skills that would be highly valued by an alternative employer may not be taught
because others on the staff already fulfill that function. As a result, the package of general skills that workers
develop are always more valuable at the training fmn than at other firms even when each individual skill is
correctly perceived to be useful elsewhere.
A second reason why the market may behave as if general skills are effectively specific to the fIrm is that
other employers will generally be ignorant of the exact character of a new hire's general skills and, consequently,
may not assign the worker to a job that puts the skills to work. Even when a worker's next job makes use of
the general skills learned, there is no guarantee that new hires with better than average skills will be offered
comparably higher entry wages. These phenomena have the effect of transforming some skills which are
technically general into skills which are effectively specific to the firm. To the extent training is effectively
specific, wages will rise more slowly than productivity net of training cost (Bishop and Kang 1984, 1988).
Support for this signaling/visibility explanation of the gap between productivity and'wage rate effects
of training comes from comparing the gaps between wage growth and productivity growth effects of training for
specific types of training. In Appendix Table 1, all forms of training had roughly equal effects on productivity
growth. For wage growth, however, formal training had much larger effects than other forms of training and
OJT by co-workers had no effect. Apparently, formal training is either less specific to the job or more visible
to the employee and other employers, and thus workers are more willing to contribute to its costs.
The third reason why general training may masquerade as specific training is the inability/unwillingness
of most young workers (the ones who have the greatest need for general training) to fmance large amounts_of
general on-the-job training. As discussed earlier, when workers face liquidity constraints, fmns will often fmd
that it is optimal to induce workers to undertake general training by offering to share the costs and benefIts of
the training.
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If, as argued above, employers are sharing the costs and benefits of training that develo~ skills that are
useful at other fums, underprovision of such training is going to result if turnover rates are non trivial.
4. CAN VOCATIONAL TRAINING IN SCHOOLS SUBSTITUTE FOR EMPWYER TRAINING?
Many societies have tried to deal with the presumed tendency of employers and workers to underinvest
in skill training by establishing school based occupational training programs. While high quality occupational
training offered by schools ameliorates the problem of under provision of skill training, school based training
cannot replace some kinds of employer training and is generally less effective than employer provided training
in the same skills. There are a number of advantages to locating skill training at firms rather than schools.
Advanta2es of LocatinB: Occupational Training at the Work Site: Often, training in a skill can only be
organized by the employer. This is obviously the case when skills are specific to the fum or partially specific to
the firm, but is also sometimes the case for completely general skills as well. General skills are often easier to
learn when they are integrated into a training program that is specific to the context of a particular firm. The
need for particular general skills is often generated by the introduction of new technology and new equipment
or a reorganization of the business. The fum must select which skill is to be taught and when. Since firms quite
reasonably desire to have all employees use the same word processing and fmancial analysis programs, the
selection of such a program must be centralized. IBM first developed the FORTRAN computer language and
then taught it to its employees and customers. Colleges and universities eventually offered courses in
FORTRAN, but it took many years for schools to take over the bulk of the teaching of this very general skill.
Even when the same skills are to be taught, employer provided training is generally more effective than
school based training? Seven reasons appear to account for this. rust, most individuals who obtain occupational
training from a school do not obtain jobs in the occupation they studied in school, while most of those trained
by an employer stay in the occupation. For graduates of vocational training programs in the US, only 43 percent
of the employed graduates out of school between one and ten years had a training related job (broadly defmed)
in the 1985 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (Campbell et al., 1987). Other studies of high school
vocational education using the same methodology obtain similar results. Felstehausen's (1973) study of 1981
vocational graduates in Illinois found training related placement rates of 27 percent in business occupations, 17
percent in trade and industry, 52 percent in health, and 20 percent in agriculture. Conroy and Diamond's study
(1976) of Massachusetts graduates obtained a training related placement rate of 29 percent for business and 37
percent for trades and industry. High school vocational education is not the only occupational skills training
program with low training related placement rates. The proportion of CET A participants whose occupational
field 12 months after completion of classroom training matched their field of training was only 41 percent for
-_.1
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clerical training, 39 percent for training in operative occupations and 29 to 32 percent for professional and aaft
training (Barnow 1985).
When, on the other hand, employers are heavily involved in providing occupational training, it is much
more likely to be used. Mangum and Ball (1986) found in their analyses of Nl.S data that employer controlled
training institutions have much higher training related placement rates. Using a procedure of matching training
fields against jobs, they found that the proportion of male graduates who had at least one job in a related field
was 85 percent for company training and 71 percent for apprenticeship but only S2 percent for vocational-
technical institutes and 22 percent for proprietary business colleges. The rates for females were 82 percent for
company training but only S9 percent for nursing schools, 61 percent for vocational-technical institutes and SS
percent for proprietary business colleges. Six months after passing a German apprenticeship examination, 68
percent of those with civilian jobs were employed in the occupation for which they were trained (much more
narrowly defined) (Federallnstitute for Vocational Training, 1986).'.
The second reason why learning skills on a job is to be preferred to learning those skills in a classroom
is the fact that trainees are well-motivated because skills developed are almost certain to be used, and because
promotions and pay inaeases go to those who do well. Third, the training is generally tutorial in nature and this
is known to be an effective teaching method. Fourth, training is generally done by supervisors and coworkers
who are aware of the trainee's progress and can give necessary corrective instruction. F1fth, the equipment and
materials necessary to the training are generally readily available at the work site and time on the machine for
the trainee can generally be arranged without disrupting production. When schools provide the training,
equipment must be specially purchased and keeping the equip!l1ent up-ta-date is often prohibitively expensive.
Sixth, the trainer (not just the trainee) is held accountable for success since the training is designed to increase
productivity and supervisor/trainers are held accountable for the productivity of the work group. Fmally, when
employers provide training the trainee's time tends to be used much more efficiently. Because they are paying
for both the trainer and the trainee's time and receive most of the benefits, employers have much stronger
incentives to select cost effective training strategies than schools which neither pay the time costs of the trainee
nor receive any of the direct benefits of the skills that are developed.
Advant82es of School Based Occupational Traininu: School based occupational training is not without
its advantages. First, school based occupational training systems can be structured to allow individuals to select
the occupation for which they will prepare and to offer scheduling flexibility to the learner. Fmn based systems
C8IU1otbe so structured. When firms provide occupational training, competition to enter an occupation occurs
before training rather after. Secondly, when trainers with the necessary expertise are scarce, schools are a way
to get the maximum out of a limited supply of expert trainers. Even very large enterprises often do not have
a sufficient flow of trainees requiring instruction in a particular subject to warrant developing in house the
expertise necessary to teach that subject.
3S
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Thirdly, many enterprises are too small to mount training by themselves and so are forced to rely on
training programs organized by schools and trade associations. For skills that are teachable m a classroom
environment, schools can achieve significant economies of scale by putting one teacher in front of many students"
and by having one teacher teach the same course to different groups of students. The teaching experience such
teachers accumulate presumably improves their teaching skills. F'mally, certification of skills is made easier by
the centralization of the training function into a smaller number of institutions.
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ENDNOTES
1. If the arithmetic mean were being reported these numbers would be considerably larger. Nevertheless
these numbers seem low especially for professional and managerial jobs.
2. Because the period for which training intensity is measured is much shorter than the period over which
productivity growth is measured, an assumption must be made about the strength of the correlation
between training intensity during the first 3 months and training hours during the rest of the 2-year
period. When the two year productivity gain of the typical new hire is being analyzed, a unit increase
in a training activity during the fIrst 3 months was assumed to be associated with a further 2-unit
increase in that training activity during the rest of the 2-year period. When the productivity gain during
the rust fourteen months for a particular new hire is being analyzed, a unit increase in a training activity
during the first 3 months was assumed to be associated with a further 1.2 unit increase in that training
activity during the remainder of the first year on the job.
3. Indeed, some of the competencies that SCANS claims to be generic such as budgeting, technical,
scheduling, and problem solving may be context or occupation specific and not generic.
4. This characterization of the NOcn exams is based on a conversation with Bruce Broman, Coordinator
of special projects at NOcn, 616-796-4695. NOcn retains the answer sheets for as much as 10 years
so it would not be two difficult to develop data on how particular items were answered by different
groups of students and how this has changed over the course of the 198Os. Many school systems
administer the exam as a pretest to students beginning a vocational program so it might also be possible
to study the gains made on NOcn exams as a function of characteristics of the student and the training
program.
5. Another consequence of the poor preparation that American students receive in high school is that
comparisons across countries of secondary school graduation rates and college entry rates are quite
misleading. We are justly proud that 60 percent of high school graduates now enter college (Bureau
of Labor Statistics June 26, 1990), but most college freshmen and sophomores are studying material that
Europeans study in secondary school and most college entrants never complete a bachelors degree. The
poor preparation of students in high school and the absence of rigorous standards for admission to
degree credit programs in college has resulted in high college drop out rates. Participation in
postsecondary education is expanding rapidly in other industrialized nations. For males, the ratio of
higher education graduates to the population 24 years old is 33 percent for Japan, 25 percent for the
United States, 20.6 percent for Canada, and 14-16 percent for England, France and Germany (NCES
1990, Indicator 2.8). Demand for highly educated workers has grown very rapidly during the last 30
years. After a slump during the 19705, the wage premiums for college educated workers are now higher
than in other industrialized countries and signifIcantly higher than ever before during the postwar period.
The very high payoff to completing a college degree has stimulated only a modest increase in rates of
college completion, however. For the high school class of 1980, only 18.8 percent had obtained a
bachelors degree by February 1986 NCES 1991). In the absence of major improvements in American
secondary education, it is not unreasonable to project that by the year 2010 that Canada and much of
the continental Europe will graduate a larger share of their 25 year olds from college than we do. Since
highly educated workers receive substantially more training from their employers, these trends suggest
that employer investments in training may well be growing more rapidly overseas than in the US.
6. Lack of information about the quality of general OJT received can increase investment in general OJT
only under the very unlikely circumstances of very high retention rates and large differentials between
the rates at which employers and employees trade off present before-tax income for future before-lax
52
income. Under these circumstances the employer's desire to invest in ge~eral fraining may be stronger
than the worker's desire. Because the wage will have to be increased by an equiv81ent amount,
employers cannot benefit from (and therefore do not pay for) general training that is visible to other
employers. Consequently, as such training becomes more visible to other employers, the c:alculus that
determines the amount of training shifts to give greater weight to the very high discount rates faced by
the worker, possibly reducing investment in general training. The condition that would have to be
satisfied is that the retention rate would have to be equal to or greater than the ratio of the firm and
worker discount factors. Even if the worker were to face yearly interest rates that were double the
firm's rate (e.g., 30 percent rather than 15 percent), the yearly retention rate would have to be above
85 percent. Retention rates for the first year at a job are seldom above 50 percent and average yearly
retention rates for all employees new and old seldom exceed 85 percent. Yearly retention rates of
employees who have been at the firm for many years may exceed 85 percent, but these more mature
workers will typically have better access to capital markets than younger workers and face a tax regime
that is neutral to OJT. This discussion has been based on the theoretical analysis of the training
decision presented in Bishop and Kang (1984, 1988).
7. Well-trained employees who leave the firm that provided the training may benefit if their new employer
eventually learns of their greater-than-anticipated productivity and makes later adjustments to the wage
or bases a promotion on it. In the model presented in Bishop and Kang (1984, 1988), high renegotiation
costs prevent such adjustments from occurring at the first employer. If a third period was added to the
model and retention in the second job modeled, the same assumption of high renegotiation costs would
prevent the worker from benefiting from better-than-expected training in the second job. If one were
to relax the assumption that post-training wage rates are prespecified and analyze a multi-period mode~
the size of the distortion to training investment decisions would be reduced, but it would not disappear.
Productivity is measured with error so one could never expect the new employer to perceive the full
value of the worker's greater-than-anticipated training. Furthermore, other employers remain ignorant
of greater-than-anticipated productivity. To all intents and purposes this greater productivity is specific
to the firm, so the worker will only receive a small share of this greater productivity in higher wage
rates.
8. If training an employee causes a reduction in output or necessitates an increase in hours paid, profits
and thus taxes are reduced. If workers pay for training by accepting lower wage jobs, individual income
tax payments are reduced. In both of these cases, training costs are effectively deductible in the year
they are incurred. If all individuals pay taxes every year at the same marginal tax rate, the tax system
would not distort decisions to invest in OJT. In fact, however, some training costs are not deductible
and tax rates are generally higher when benefits are being received than when costs are being incurred,
so the tax system discourages training investments.
9. Becker clearly recognized the existence of liquidity constraints in his 1962 paper. .Since employer
specific skills are part of the intangible assets or good will of flTIDSand can be offered as collateral along
with tangible assets, capital would be more readily available for specific than for general investments
(p.42)." He did not, however, explicitly analyze how such constraints might influence the tenure profUe
of wages and thus induce employers to share the costs of general training. Parsons (1972) points out
that "The worker's ...discount rate will affect the fITm's choice of wage policies It can be shown that
firms will decrease the worker's share of specific investment as the workers discount the future more
heavily (p.1129)."
10. Policy capturing experiments have found that employers give substantially higher ratings to job applicants
with high grade point averages (Hollenbeck and Smith 1984).
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11. The survey was of a stratified random sample of the NFlB membership. Larger firms had 'a significantly
higher probability of being selected for the study. The response rat~ to the mall survey was 20 percent
and the number of usable responses was 2014.
The Supreme Court's decision in the Wards Cove Packing Case has made it easier for employers to
defend the use of selection methods that produce adverse impact and has therefore opened the door
for increased use of employment tests. It appears that employers will be able to justify the use of
employment tests without having to undertake costly validity studies in their own firm by citing validity
research done for similar jobs in other firms. Congress is considering legislation that would reverse
Wards Cove and make it even harder to defend the use of selection procedures which have adverse
impact than under the Griggs precedent. If this legislation passes, the ability of firms to make wise
hiring decisions will deteriorate even more.
Mincer (1989), for example, attempts to calculate a rate of return to the worker's investment in training
by dividing the percentage wage increase by estimates of the cost of training (generally running between
.2 and .25 of a years productivity) that are based on the fraction of a years time that worker's report
they spend in training. This fraction tells us something about the combined employer and employee
costs of training not the costs incurred by the trainee. In fact, in the Lillard and Tan (1986 Table 4.3
and 45) earnings regression which Mincer uses to estimate the depreciation rate for training, trainees
experienced no earnings reduction during the year in which training was received. Similar results have
been obtained in other data sets (Parsons 1985, Bishop and Kang 1988, Barron, Black and Loewenstein
1989). While the positive association between current training and current earnings is probably due to
the omission of unobserved worker quality, it strains credibility that the true earnings sacrifice is 20-25
percent of a years wages when multivariate models that include schooling, test scores, actual work
experience and a host of other variables indicate a positive effect of current training on current wages.
The worker's investment in training is probably much smaller so the wage GROR for worker
investments in training is probably much higher than the numbers estimated by Mincer.
The U.S. rate of training related placement might have been somewhat higher if measured 6 months
after high school graduation. However, the German defmitions of relatedness are more rigorous and
applying them to U.S. data would have lowered training related placement rates. High unemployment
rates no doubt contribute to the low rates of training related placement in the U.S. However, aggregate
differential between the countries in training related placement cannot be attributed to differentials in
the general tightness of labor markets.
RESEARrn ON EMPWYBR TRAINING
10/13/91 DKAFr
55
APPENDIX ON mE EOPP EMPLOYER SURVEY
AND
THE MEASUREMENT OF TRAINING AND PRODUCfIVI1Y GROWfH
The analysis is based on data from a survey of 3,412 employers sponsored by the National Institute on
Education (NIE) and the National Center for Research in Vocational Education (NCRVE) conducted between
February and June 1982. The survey was the second wave of a two-wave longitudinal survey of employers from
selected geographic areas across the country. The first wave was funded by the U.S. Department of Labor to
collect data on area labor market effects of the Employment Opportunity Pilot Projects (EOPP). The survey
encompassed 10 EOPP pilot sites and 18 comparison sites selected for their similarity to the pilot sites. The ES-
202 lists of companies paying unemployment insurance taxes provided the sample frame for the survey. Because
of the interest in low wage labor markets, the sample design specified that establishments in industries with a
relatively high proportion of low-wage workers be over sampled. The tax paying units were stratified by the
estimated number of low wage employees and the number of establishments selected from each strata was
roughly in proportion to the estimated number of low wage workers at the establishments in that strata. Within
strata the selection was random. The survey was conducted over the phone and obtained a response rate of 75
percent.
The second wave attempted to interview all of the respondents in the fITst-wave survey. About 70 percent
of the original respondents completed surveys for the second wave. Most of the respondents were the
owner/manager of small fIrms who were quite familiar with the performance of each of the firm's employees.
Seventy percent of the establishments had fewer than 50 employees, and only 12 percent had more than 200
employees. In large organizations the primary respondent was the person in charge of hiring, generally the
personnel officer. If the primary respondent was unable to answer questions about the training received by newly
hired workers in the sampled job, that part of the interview was completed by talking to a supervisor or someone
else with line responsibility.
The employers who received the full questionnaire were. asked to select "the last new employee your
company hired prior to August 1981 regardless of whether that person is still employed by your company." Only
2594 employers had hired someone in the time frame requested and these employers constitute the sample used
in the study.
The respondent was asked to report how much time typical new hires for this job spent during the fITst
three months of employment in four different kinds of training activities: (1) watching others do the job rather
than doing it themselves, (2) formal training programs, (3) informal individualized training and extra supervision
by management and line supervisors, and (4) informal individualized training and extra supervision by co-workers.
For the sample of fITms and jobs, the means for the typical worker were 47.3 hours watching others do the job
(Tw), 10.7-hours for formal training programs (TF), 51 hours for informal training by management (Ts), 24.2
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hours for informal training by co-workers (Td. A copy of the relevant portions of the questionnaire is available
from the author.
A training time index was constructed by rust valuing trainer and trainee time relative to that of workers
with two years of tenure in that job and then combining the time invested in training activities during the first
three months on the job. The employers reported that workers with two years of tenure in the job averaged
between 22 and 50 percent (depending on occupation and other worker characteristics) more productive than
new hires during their first three months on the job. This ratio was calculated for each job/worker category and
used to place a relative value on coworker time devoted to training.' The management staff members who
provide formal and informal training were assumed to be paid 1.5 times the wage of coworkers with 2 years of
tenure. Formal training involves both the trainer and trainee's time. Sometimes it is one-on-one and sometimes
it is done in groups. It was assumed that the average ratio of trainees to trainers was 3 and that the value of
the trainer's time (including the amortized cost of developing the training package) was three times the wage
of a coworker with two years of tenure. When supervisors and coworkers are giving informal training to a new
employee, the trainee is almost invariably directly involved in a production activity. Employers report that for
informal training, the trainees are typically as productive while being trained as they are when working alone
(Hollenbeck and Smith 1984). Consequently, informal training is assumed to involve only the investment of the
trainer's time. Thus in units of coworker time the value of trainer time is:
(a1) Valued Trainer Time = Tc + 1.S.Ts + TF
In units of trainee time, the time the trainee spends not producing because of training activities is:
(81) Trainee Time = Tw + TF
The total investment in training in trainee time unit~ is:
(a3) Total Training Investment = Tw + TF + (Tc + 1.5.Ts + TF)/RP.
where
RP = the productivity of the average new hire during the rust 3 months divided by the productivity of
typical worker with two years' tenure
The arithmetic mean of this index is 209 hours, implying that the value of the time invested in training a typical
new employee in the rust three months is about 40 percent of the output that the trainee can produce working
full-time during the rust three months on the job.
The survey asked the employer (or in larger rums the immediate supervisor) to report on productivity
of the tvDical individual hired in the job after two weeks, during the next 11 weeks and at the end of two years
at the rum. The rating was made on a "scale of zero to 100 where 100 equals the maximum productivity rating
any of your employees in (NAME'S) position can obtain and zero is absolutely no productivity by your
employee." For the full data set at the mean values of these indexes of reported productivity were 49.0 for (he
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first two weeks, 64.6 for the next 11 weeks and 81.4 at the time of the interview. The questiOD-sasking for a
rating of the productivity of particular workers had a nonresponse rate of only 4.4 percent. Comparably defined
nonresponse rates for other questions were 8.2 percent for previous relevant experience, 3.2 percent for age, 6.7
percent for education, 8.6 percent for time spent in informal training by supervisor, and 5.7 percent for a three-
question sequence from which starting wage rate is calculated. The low-nonresponse rate implies that our
respondents felt that they were capable of making such judgments and augur well for the quality of the data that
results.
The interview questions about the productivity of recently hired employees do not measure productivity
in any absolute sense and therefore are not comparable across rums or across jobs in a rum. Rather, they are
intended as ratio scale indicators of the relative productivity of a typical (or a particular) worker at different
points in their tenure at a firm. Under an assumption that these productivity indexes are proportional
transformations of true productivity plus a random error, percentage differences in cell means of the productivity
index will be unbiased estimators of percentage differences in true productivity. If the variations in the
productivity scores assigned by supervisors exaggerate the proportionate variations in the true productivity, our
estimates of percentage differences in productivity between two workers will be biased upward. Even though
it is possible for a worker's true productivity to be negative, the scale was defined as having a lower limit of zero.
floors and ceilings on a scale typically cause measurement errors to be negatively correlated with the true value.
If this is the case, then our estimates of percentage differences in productivity between two workers will be biased
downward. This latter type of bias appears to be more likely than the former.
Further evidence that the proportionality assumption results in an understatement of percentage
differences in productivity between individual workers doing the same job comes from comparing the coefficients
of variation of productivity in this and other data sets. If pairs of workers who are still at the rum are used to
construct a coefficient of variation for this data set, it averages .13 for sales clerks, clerical, service and blue collar
workers. This estimate of the coefficient of variation is smaller than the estimates of the coefficient of variation
for yearly output derived from analysis of objective ratio scale measures of output. These estimates were 35 for
sales clerks, .144 for semi-skilled blue collar workers, .28 in craft jobs, .164 for workers in routine clerical jobs
and .278 in clerical jobs with decision making responsibilities (Hunter, Schmidt and Judiesch 1988). This means
that the estimates of the effect of training on productivity growth reported in this paper are probably
conservative. The fact that the employer is reporting on the past productivity of particular employees may also
generate biases in data but it is not clear how estimates of productivity growth rates might be influenced by this
problem.
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2. Impact of Training on Worker Productivity
The learning curve is very steep during the first 2 years of employment at a firm. A part of this
productivity increase is due to learning by doing and occurs even in the absence of training. Formal and informal
training are responsible for a major portion of the productivity growth, however. In this section, an effort will
be made to determine how much of the gain in productivity is due to training, to caJculate which training
methods are most effective and to assess the rate of return to training investments.
The 1982 Employer Survey distinguished four different types of employer-provided training: (1) formal
training (provided by a training professional), (2) time spent watching others do the job, (3) informal on-the-job
training by supervisors, and (4) informal on-the-job training by co-workers. The impact of training on
productivity growth of typicaJ new employees was estimated by regressing productivity growth during the fIrst
2 years on the hours spent in each training activity, the duration of training and a vector of control variables.
Since diminishing returns are to be expected, the square of the total cost of training was included in the model.
Productivity growth during the fIrst 2 years was defmed in 2 different ways: the logarithm of the productivity
growth ratio and the change in productivity ratings on a 0-100 scaJe divided by the mean productivity rating for
workers with two years of tenure.
The measures of time spent in speciftc training activities in the fIrst 3 months on the job are measures
of training intensity rather than of aggregate training investment during the fust 2 years on the job.
Consequently, the reported required length of training--the log of the weeks before a new employee becomes
fully trained and qualified--was also included in the model. A full set of controls for job, occupation, and fIrm
characteristics was included in each model. The control variables included the characteristics of the new hire,
the occupation, SVP, and GED of the job, percent of craft workers and percent of skilled workers at the fum,
the cost of machinery used in the job, unionization, importance of vocational training in selection, percentage
of the firm's work force under age 25, and reported difficulty in fmding reliable unskilled workers. The
speciftcation used was the following:
(a4) P2YR-P2WK= AX + a,/nL + a.zTF +
~ Ts + a. Tc + ~ Tw + Be-ye + U
where X = a vector of control variables listed in Table A1 (d is a vector of coefficients on these control
variables)
lnL = logarithm of the required length of training
TF = Hours devoted to formal training during the fust 3 months ('OOs).
Ts = Hours spent in informal training by supervisors during the fust 3 months ('00s).
Tc = Hours spent in informal training by coworkers during the fust 3 months ('OOs).
Tw = Hours spent training by watching others do the work during the fust 3 months('OOs).
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T = Training Intensity is a weighted sum of the four different types of training where the weight reflect the
assumed costliness of this form of training. T = 1.8*TF + 1.5*TS+ To + .8*TW'
Prt'R - Productivity of the typical worker at the end of 2 years. In the linear models P2YRis the productivity
rating on the 0 to 100 scale divided by BO, the mean productivity rating for workers with two years of
tenure. In the logarithmic models, P2YR is the logarithm of the productivity rating plus S.
P2WK = Productivity of the typical worker during the first 2 weeks. In the linear models P2WKis the
productivity rating on the 0 to 100 scale divided by BO,the mean productivity rating for workers with two
years of tenure. In the logarithmic models, PZWKis the logarithm of the productivity rating plus S.
The results of estimating equation a4 are reported in table AI. The regression with the logged
productivity growth as dependent variable is in column 1. Regressions predicting the linear measure of
productivity growth are in columns 2 and 3. In both models, the coefficient on the square term is negative and
statistically significant indicating that there are diminishing returns to training intensity. When the square of total
training intensity is included in the mode~ all four of the linear terms for particular forms of training have
positive and statistically significant effects on productivity growth. The effect of training intensity on productivity
is quite large. An increase in any of the training activities from 0 to 100 hours raises the worker's productivity
by 13 to 15 percent in the logarithmic models and by 4 to 7.7 percent (calculated at the mean level of
productivity at the end of two years) in the linear models. Clearly when training intensity is low, increases in
its intensity will produce large increases in worker productivity. The length of training also has large positive
effects on productivity growth.3
The total effect of training on productivity growth was calculated by multiplying the six estimated
coefficients by mean values of the corresponding variables. The calculated increase in productivity was 22
percent (32 percent of the gain over the fIrst two years) in the logarithmic model and 12 percent of fInal levels
of productivity (28 percent of the gain) in the linear model.
An alternative approach to estimating the impacts of training is to examine the productivity growth of
particular new hires. Column 3 of Table Al presents results using productivity data on a particular new hire
rather than a typical new hire. Missing data reduces sample sizes by about 100. The variance of productivity
growth across firms is larger when actual individuals are the data rather than typical individuals. R squares of
the models are slightly higher, however, because characteristics of the worker and the worker's tenure at the time
of the interview are included in the structural model of productivity growth. In order to reduce simultaneity
problems, the training variables used in these models were for a typical new hire rather than for that particular
new hire. Comparisons of the coefficients in column 2 and 3 reveal that substituting data on productivity growth
outcomes of particular individuals for data on typical hires and controlling for personal characteristics does not
change the estimated effects of training.
.
The impacts of each type of training are remarkably similar. This was not anticipated because some
forms of training (e.g., formal training) have higher hourly costs than others (e.g., watching others do the work),
Productivity Growth Wa,e Growth (Jog)
Typical Typical Particular Typical Particular
Worker Worker Individual (2 Yrs) Individual
(log 2 Yrs.) (linear 2 Yrs.) Linear (1.1 Yrs)
(1.1 Yrs)
LIt Lenllh of Training .068*** (6.43) .032*** (6.09) .025*** (4.36) .010... (2.84) .008.*(2.49)
Mo. of Traininl in first Quaner
Formal Training (lOO's) .133**. (3.06) .046** (2.14) .048.. (2.10) .043... (3.13) .027..(2.05)
Training by Supervisors (IOO's) .130*.. (3.85) .067." (4.01) .043** (2.44) .020. (1.83) .017 (1.61)
Training by Co-workers (IOO's) .145". (4.92) ,(rn*" (5.30) .057." (3.70) .001 (.IS) -.002 (.25)
Watching Olhers (IOO's) .149*.* (7.37) .053*" (5.30) .046". (4.32) .017.. (2.54) .016.. (2.55)
Training Intensity Squared (10,000'5)
-.0085** (2.27) -.0049" (2.61) -.0050* (2.53) -.0011 (.92) -.0011 (.97)
Standard Error of Estimate .597 .295 .3~ .187 .178
Rl
.171 .129 .135 .198 .233
Number of ObserVitions 2116 2116 2002 1986 1963
*
Significant at die I"' level (two-sided)
,
*. Significant at die S'*' level (two-sided)
... SignifIC8'ltat die I% level (two-sided)
Table A ,
Impact fI Training on Wage and Producdvlty Growth
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and this was expected to result in the more expensive forms of training having larger mar~ impacts on
productivity than the cheaper forms. Measured in the units of productivity of a worker with 2 y~s of tenure
on the job, the hourly cost of learning by watching others is .pproximately.8. Formal training with an assumed
cost factor of 1.8 is the most expensive because it requires the time of both the trainee and the trainer. The cost
factor for informal training by supervisors (1.5) and for informal training by co-workers (1.0) lie between these
two extremes because the trainee is engaged in production and only the time of the supervisor and co-worker
must be charged off as a cost of training. If one accepts these estimates of the relative hourly cost of different
forms of training, the results imply that informal training has higher rates of return than formal training. A
further implication is that within the informal training category, co-worker training and training yourself by
watching others have the highest rate of return."
3. Impact or Training on Wage Growth
The costs and benefits of investments in on-the-job training are shared by employer and employee. This
implies that jobs with a great deal of training will tend to have lower starting wage rates than would otherwise
be predicted and higher wage rates once the training is completed. In other words, jobs with a heavy training
component--either because it requires great skill or because the people being hired for it are completely
inexperienced--will have higher rates of wage growth than other jobs. The more general the training the greater
will be the share of training costs that is paid by the new employee and the greater will be the resulting rate of
wage growth. Since some types of training are more effective than others, some are more general than others
and some are more visible to other employers than others, one would expect different types of training to have
different effects on wage growth. Are the impacts of different types of training on wage growth similar in pattern
to their impacts on productivity growth? Or, is the pattern of wage growth responses to different types of
training more influenced by the generality and visibility of the specific type of training?
These issues were addressed by estimating wage growth counterparts to the productivity growth models
presented in Tables AI. The fIrst dependent variable studied was the log of the ratio of the fIrm's current wage
for a worker with 2 years of tenure to the actual starting wage of a person who had recently been hired for the
position. Models predicting this variable control for the effects of wage inflation by including the date of hire
and it's square in the specification. The results are presented in column 4 of Table AI.
The second dependent variable is the log of the ratio of the current wage rate (or most recent wage if
there has been a separation) and the starting wage rate for a particular new employee who was hired on average
14 months earlier. The model predicting this variable is presented in column 5 of table AI. The control variables
are the same as those used in the productivity growth models.
The first conclusion that can be drawn from an examination of the wage growth results is that training
does have the hypothesized positive effect on wage growth. The effect is statistically significant in almost aIJ of
the models. Comparisons of these coefficients with the estimates of the impact of training on productivity
growth, however, reveal that training has a much smaller impact on wage growth than it has on productivity
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growth. In table Al an increase in informal training from 0 to 100 hours raises productivity of typical employees
by 13 to 15 percent in the logarithmic model and 5.3 to 7.7 percent in the linear model, but raises wage rates
by only .1 to 2.0 percent. A doubling of the length of training raises productivity by 2:2 to 4.8 perccnt. but wage
rates rise only 0.7 percent. In Bishop 1990 it is shown that this pattern of results prevails even when the
employer reports that all of the skills learned on the job are useful at other rums.
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ENDNOTES FOR APPENDIX
1. The use of the ratio to estimate the relative productivity implicitly involves an assumption that the
.
productivity reports received from employers are a proportional transformation of true productivity plus
a random error. It is assumed that the unknown factor of proportionality can be different for every job,
every firm and every respondent but a single respondent always uses the same proportionality factor
when answering our questions. If alternatively it were assumed that these reports exaggerate the rate
of growth of productivity with tenure by a factor of 2, estimates of training investment would be 7 to 15
percent lower. Comparisons across occupations or oCnew hires with different qualifications would not
change appreciably.
2. The index was constructed under an assumption that the four training activities were mutually exclusive.
This implies that if the sum of the hours devoted to individual activities is greater than 520, that a
reporting error has occurred which overstates investment of training. In the few cases where the sum
of hours devoted to training exceeded 520, the training time index was adjusted downward by the ratio
of 520 to the sum of the hours reported for individual activities. This procedure reduces the mean of
the index by about 10 percent. The cost of the trainer and amortization of training package development
costs was assumed to be two-thirds of the foregone productivity of a supervisor, since formal training
often spreads fixed costs over more than one trainee. Thus 1.8 = (2/3)1.5 + .8.
3. To test for possible effects of measurement error and simultaneity bias, instrumental variables estimates
were obtained for a simple model containing omy three training variables-- logarithm of training length,
training intensity, and training intensity squared. The variable used as instruments for length and
intensity of training were: the number of alternative employers, dummies for industry, the growth rate
of employment, the growth rate of sales, the number of employees at the establishment, the size of firm,
the wage rate, a dummy for wage at or below the minimum wage, a dummy for temporary job, dummies
for no probationary period, the log of length of the probationary period, dummies for not knowing if
there is a probationary period, a measure of the difficulty of firing a worker after the probationary period
is ended, a measure of the importance of seniority in determining who is laid off, and characteristics of
the local labor market. It appears that measurement error is a problem in the training intensity variable,
for the IV estimates for this variable remain highly significant and become about three times larger. The
IV estimates for length of training have a negative sign.
4. Measurement error may bias these coefficients in a way that makes these fmdings stronger. Our
respondent (generally a boss, supervisor, or personnel manager) probably had better knowledge of time
spent in formal training and informal training by supervisors than of time spent in other forms of
training. This should have resulted in the coefficients on these forms of training having a smaller
measurement error bias than the coefficientson informal training by co-workers and time spent watching
others. Thus, correcting for measurement error in the individual indicators might raise the coefficients
on these last two forms of training by more than it raises the coefficients on Cormaltraining.
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~'(:ars.
"""'SC' c'hc'('k thC' bus iU yuur ri~hl and n'turn tlw """''C'y furm.
1. Hew.' many C"mplo~'('(~ cto yon c'\lm'nt1~' ha\'(' (Dot Indudln~ you1'1iC"IO'!
(ull.UmC' parHlmC'
0
2-4
S-fo
2. In the' past two ~'('ars. has Ihc' total num1x'r of c-mployef's InC'N'aSl-d.dC'('N'aSf'd.or .ta~'t"d thC' samC"! (Count part-time- 7-~
f'mployf't'S as 1/2 an eomployt'e-.)
1.1000f'e'aM'dby e-mplo~'C'f1t 3. 'Staye-d thr same
2. Drc~ by . -. f'mployt'f'S 4. Nolin business two ~ars
3. Fon~'hlC'hjob have' you hlrC'd the mosl Pf'oplt' o\~rthe- last Iwo or Ihrt'C'~~ars. IIfyou haVf'morC'than one job for whirh you ha\~ 10.'
done- a lot of hlrtns;l plt'asr srlt'Ct the Job N'qulrtn!: the grratest skllJ.I All futurC' que-stlons rC'ft'rto this job.
I. Mt'Chanlcs and Rrpalrrrs. 4. SaJes derks. t'ashlrrs. e-tC'. 8. Adm support. e.g. dcrtcaJ. 11. Mac-hint' Ope-rators
prt'Clslon production 5. SC'rviCC'OCC'up.e-.g.guard, banktc-l1rr. hotel clrrk. 12. Drt\~rs. mo\~rs. etc.
2. Construction trade-so wallN'ss. bar1x'r. Janitor tlckrt age-nt 13.0thrr
f'.g. elC'Ctriclan 6. LaborC'r.handlrr 9. Technit'lans. e.g. lab tech.
3. Sales J"C'pl'C'Rntath'C'S. 7. ManageriaJ IAdministration drafters. programmeor&
e.g. InsuranC'C' a~ents. 10. Professional Speciality.
manufacturrrs' J"C'p. e.g. e~lnt'C'r. RN's. designers
6. Which of thesC' abilities influent'C' hiring se1ectlons the most? (Put a "1- next to the most Important. a "2" nrxt to thr second
most ImponanL a -3" next to the third most Important. a -4- nrxt to the fourth most Important. rtc. . Plrase assign each a
ranking.)
-
Oc-cupationaJ / Job skills (al",ad)' has them)
-
Ability to learn nC'Woccupational and job skUls
-
\\brk habits and attltudr
-
hoplr skills
-
~adershlp ability
-
Reading. writing. math and rC'asonlng
7. HowfrrquentJ)' do Indh1duals in this job ha\"t'to do each of thr foUo\Ao1ng?(Pleasr mark thr appropriate fN'qurnc'yfor rach.l
4. How accurately do you frrl you C'anassrss each of the follo\\1ng
abilities in emplo)'rrs prior to hiring them? (Plrasr mark Ihr
appropriate rating for each).
L Occ-upatlon and Job skills (aJready has them). , , . , . , . . . ,
b. Ability to learn nt'\\. occupational and Job skills. . . , . . . . .
C. \\brk habits and attltudr !t1')1ng hard. enthusiasm.
punctualltyl
." ,.., ,..........
d. hoplr skills !teamwork. appe-arance. grttlng aJong
v.1th others}. . '.. . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
e. ~adrrshlp ability ho organlzr. teach and motlvatr others.
soh~ problrms}. . . . . . .. . . .
r. Reading. writing. math and reasoning ability. . . . . . . . . .
5. Afteran emplo,)"t'ehas been on the job 6 months. how accurately
can you and/or line suprrvlsors measure ~ job prrfonnancr?
a. ~ a lan~ua~r othrr than Enl!1lsh
b. & taught a new skill or prOCC'dure
C. ~C'h somronr elsr a nrw skill or prOC't'durr
d. Uw arithmetic or decimals
e. Use algrbra. trigonomrtry or caJculus
r. Wrttr somrthlng longer than 100 words
g. Make an oral prC'5entation of 2 minutes or morC'
h. Rrad one or morC'pages of text
I. 1)'pr (or kry Into a Itrmlna!1 one-or more pagrs of text
1- tJscoa C'a1rulator
k. US('a rompute-r (otht'r than word prt>C'f'Sslngor data entry)
1. 5upt'rv1~ another emploYfT
m U~ knowlt'dfi!,t'fi!,alnf'dof ("hC'mlstry.phYSIC'S.blol~'
1 2 653 4
Neftr
1
1 or 2 .
Year
2
MODthly
3
Absolute
Ace1U'8cy
8 9 12
8 9 13
8 9
"
8 9 1~
8
8
9
9
1e
17
7 98 1e
'9
2C
2~
2;
2,
2':
Weekly
4
Dany
5
2~
2t
27
2E
2'"
3G
3'
3,
3~
~.:
3'
3'
3-
... ~.. -..
~, ft'Tft nno hrs "I.a..
./
- -'--
tt \\1m' lM'n1'u'UI!r of Cho~' hln-d fur ,h,s jub Uft. '~l"c.itlly Dot wl/h Ihc' firm... Ihr .'ud of iI ~"'.Ir fur any n'"soll. (M.lrk (llIc'l
I. 101, or IC'ss 3. ~ 1).M't 7. 7()4t 9. 9O~ or mnn'
2. 201, 4. 401, 6. 6O~ 8. Mew.
11 Und~ 82.000
2) 82-810.000
3) 810-850.000
4) 850-8200.000
51 8200.000 and up
1. Hourly wages or uJaJ')'
2. Jndh1duallncenU~. e.g. commissions. Ups
pl~ ratn etc.
3. Group IncenU\ft. e.g. profit shartng. etc.
Plt'a~ think oftht' last ~rson hlrt'd (orthlsJobljobXJbyyourftrm prlortoAugust 1986 re,anUu8 ofwbe~erthatpel"80D i88till
employed byyoW' arm. Call this Indl\1dua] ~rson A.Tht' Indl\1dua] hired (orjob X Immediately before ~rson A Is called ~rson B.
Do not Includl" rt'hlres of (ormt'r employees. PJea~ gl\'e us tht' fono~1ng Information on th~ Indl\1duals.
9. ~ the workers In this Job C'O\'f'rrd by a
C'OIIt'C'U\'rbargaining rontrart? (Mark onf'.)
10. What share ofthe skills It'arned by n~' f'mployttS In 'his Job arr
USf'ful outaide of )'Our firm? (Mark onf'.)
I 1. How many at her ftrms In the loca] labor market ha\'r jobs sl mllar
to this one? (Mark ont'l
12. J( it were purchased today. what would be Ihe cost of tht' most
ex~nshoe machlnt' Uncludlng ~hlcles) employees In this Job
work wtth? (Mark one. I
13. How are people In this job paid? (Mark aU that apply,)
Jf no such person hired check box and do not complt'tt' column.
When was the Indlvtdual hlrt'd?
Agt' at time o( hire
Sex
Ethnlclty
Was the nN' hire mamed?
Years of formal schooling. e.g.high SC'hoolgrad. : ] 2.
coUcge grad. : 16
Did AIB recehoe relf'\'ant ocrupatfonally sPf'C'IfIC'training In a
s<:hool or tht' military. (Check all that apply.)
Number of ~ars of ocC'upationally SPf'ClfjC' tralnln~ In SC'hooJ.
Years of relnant work UPf'ri~n~ in Jobs that had somt'
application 10job X (If lf'sS than J year. mark 1/2 or 1/4. f'lc.1
Did AIB rt'C'f't\~ any reJevaDt forma! lralnln~
Irom prT\1ous l"mploYf'rs'~ (Mark aJl thai apply)
Prior
'°
t)(oln~hln'd. did Ihf' Individual know an.\'ont' workln,:!
at tht' Itrm?
.IH
I. YI'S
2. No
J!'
I) All 90-100%
2) Most 61- eg,-.
31 Half 0- ~
4) Some... . .. 11- 3g,-.
5) MlnlmaJ 0- I~
1) las than 10
2) 10-24
3) 25-100 .
4) Over 100
..0
41
42
43
Penosa A PCI'8OD B
0
I
mo yr
-years 51.;
. .4
45.'I
mo yr
-years
I.M 2.F I.M 2.F 55.;
I. Caucasian
2. Black
3. Hispanic
4. Oriental
5. Oth~r-
1. Caucasian
2. Black
3. Hispanic
4. Oriental
5. Other-
57-:
I. Yes 1. Yes 59-f2. No2. No
-years
-
years
I. None
2. Yt'S. from public Inst.
3. Yes. from pr1\'8t~ Inst.
4. Yes. from mUitary
5. Yes. from JTPA. etc.
6H
]. None
2. Yes. from publiC' Inst.
3. Yes. from pr1\'8te Inst.
4. Yt's. from military
5. Yes. from JTPA. rotc.
65-f
--
)'f'ars
-
~ars 67.~
--
)'f'ars
I. On sll!ht
2. Off sigh'
3. No
-
years
I. On sight
2. orr sight
3. No
71.7
77.~
79.f
81.E
I. Yf'S
2. No
3. Don', know
I. Yes
2. No
3 Don', kno~'
83.E
I 2 8~-S
I 2 e~-p
I 2 t~-9
t3'PI 2
t~.9
I 2
. ..
(
.. .-
I In\\' dlcllhls Indh'ldl~IIII(".lr uf )'uur .Iuh upc'IIIIIJ!!
CChc,,'k OIl(' UIIIJ.I
Whl('h of th~ follo\\1n~ I~'JX"Sof Information w~rt' obtalnr-d about
AiB prior to hiring? (Mark Iht' appropriat~ I~-pes.)
a. HI~h school or ('011r-~~transcript
b. Sc-If-rt'portf'd 5C'hool ~rad~
('. ~rforrnan~ It"sl. f'.~. typln~ tt'st. dri\'~rs tt"st.job try-out
d. AptUudf' l«'5t. e.g. GAT8. ASVAB
~t Namf':
r. CrrUOcatt" of training ~h1"d on prior job
Prior to hiring. did you obtain a rt'f~rral or r~ommt"ndaUon
Cwrittrn or oran from: (Mark th~ approprtatt" sources)
a. Immf'dlatt" 5uprn1sor or prt'vtous job(s)
b. Pt"rsonnrl om~ at pm10us job(s)
c. Pri\1U~ rmploym~nt ag~ncy
d. Public emplo)'~nt agrncy
r. JTPA or community ba~ organtzatlon
f. Vocational rt'habiUtaUon agrnc'y
g. Currt'nt (al thr Um~ of hiring) rmpl~
h. Re-gular custo~r(s) or auppHrr(s)
I. R~laUve orprrsonaJ frirnd of yours
J. High school vocational trachrr or major proft"ssor In col1~gt'
k. Othrr teachrrs. principal. school p1a~m~nt offi~. rlc.
I. Othrr (pl~ specify)
Was (~re) the contact(s) a refrrral(s) or a recomm~ndalion(s)?
(Mark all that apply.)
Had you rver hired somron~ on this person's
rrcommrndaUon before?
Was th~ job supposed to br t~mporary whrn
you hired (him/her)?
Is (hr/ahrl.Un With thr finn?
If not. whrn did hrlshr leave?
What kind of ~paratlon ~"as It?
What ...s hls/hr-r -t.a.rtiDt .'agt'?
(Plra~ Includt' commissions.
tips and Inttntlve pay.)
Whar Is ht'r/ht'r CWTeDt wa~t'?
{f'lt'aSt' Includt' commissions and InN'ntlw- pay.
Iflr-fl firm "'port wa~t' at tlmt' of ~parallon.1
Jf this t'mployt'(' wr-R' to S("('k a Job al anolht"r firm.
about how muc-h ks (or mort'! would ht'fshr probabl~ bt-
paid In a nt'w job rompaff'd to ,,'hal hrlshe- Is ('arnln~ now?
. . .
-
~~
- -
.
'~""
-...
--
. _.
PenoD A
I. \\~llk III
2. Ad\1'rilsrmc'nt
3. f'ricond/rt'1alh,.
4. Ot he-I' t"mployt't.
5. R(.fr-rral. (>.f!..5('houl.
t"mpJoymr-nt 8I-,'C'OC)'.('i(',
6. Ot h«-r
PcnoD B
I. Walk In
2. Ad\'t"rtlS<'mt"nt
3, f'rif'nd I rt'lallw-
4. Othe-r ('mpl~
5. Re-ft'rraJ. t".f!..S('hool.
t"mploymmt &Amcy,('i('.
6.0thtr
8~
-.---
-.---
-.---
-.---
-.---
-.---
-.---
-.---
-.---
-.---
I
-.---
1.Refrrral
2. Wrttt(>n recomm(>nd
3. Oral recomm(>nd
I.Yrs
2. No
3. Somr of both
I. Trmp/Seasonal
2. ~rmanrnt
I. Yes
2. No
I
mo yr
PenoD A
I. Layoff
2. Discharg(>
3. Induttd rnl~natlon
4. Voluntal)' ~slgnallon
5. Otht"r_-
S- pt"r hr
or
S-_. pt"r month
S
- -
pr-rhr
or
S pt"rmonth
1. IS." ks
2. 10% Ie-s!".
3. 5% Ic-ss
4 Samt'
5 5" mnr..
6 10'\. mon°
-r-
-r-
-r-
-r-
-r-
--r-
-r-
-r-
~
--r-
2
--r-
1.Refrrral
2. Writtrn recommrnd
3. Oral recommrnd
I.Yrs
2. No
3. Somr of both
1. T~mp!Seasona1
2. Prrmanrnt
I.Yrs
2. No
I
mo yr
Penon B
1. Layoff
2. Dlschargt'
3. InduC't'd Tt'si~nalion
4. Voluntary Tt'slgnallon
S.Olht'r
S_- pt"r hr
or
S- pt"r month
~- pt"r hr
or
~
---
pr-r month
1. }5.~ It-55
2 ) O'\. It's5
3. 5-. It's!'.
4 Same-
S 5't" mon°
6 1O'\. mo~
1-2
'-4
S-6
7-S
t-'(
,,- .
13.'
1S.'
, ~.,
1S.c
2'--
2:!..
2~.;
2~..
2~.:
3',:
"
-.:J.,:
'~-j
3"7.:
43.:
45-~
5',~
5~.r
6~'~
7;S0
hf'
Ithf'
to
as
PenoD A PenoD B
',.,..
-
.
--
15-18
_.-
---
19,22
Iftf'r
23.26
1. No 1. No 2'7-28
2. Y~s If paid 2. Y~s If paid
3. Yf'S 14'/0 pay 3. Y~s 14'/0 pay
4. Y~s. "~x~mp'" ~mploy~t' 4. Y~s. "~x~mpr' f'mployt't'
J. No J. No 29.30
2. Yes but not adoptf'd 2. Yes but not adopt~d
3. Adopted J-2Id~as 3. Adopt~d 1-2Id~as
4. Adopted 3" Ideas 4. Adopted 3" Ideas
ch -A" No "'8" "'8- Much
r Better DUler Better Better
2 3 4 5
